Is Trump's Deal With Iran a Good One for the U.S.?

to start. However, I think we need to be skeptical of Iran's promises here. Iran has promised twice previously. We will reopen the strait. There will be free passage of tankers, and then that didn't happen. Now, America has leverage here in that the removal of the U.S. blockade of Iranian ports is supposed to proceed a pace with Iran's reopening of the straits. And so we can match them there on that. However, Iran wants a certain number of days to demine 30 days, 30 days we think. And the question is, when we caught Iran trying to throw more mines in there, As this deal was being finalized, what does that tell you? It tells you Iran wants to drag out this period, not make it easy for the U.S., not allow a resumption of traffic there. We have to watch that, especially when Iran's foreign minister, Iranian media, all sorts of Iranian officials are saying the straight won't go back to normal. It'll be under... Iranian Omani control, and there will be service fees. They don't say tolls, but service fees. Explain to me what the difference between service fees and tolls is. For the life of me, I can't. Maybe they'll charge one lump sum all in front. I don't know, but it amounts to the same. And if Iranian foreign policy is going to be able to dictate what ship passes on which day, that's not. A reopened straight? But Kate, just in terms of the motivations of the administration, it really seems to me that Trump wants that straight open. He wants the oil flowing. He wants oil prices down. We're heading into a midterm election. Voters are unhappy about prices. It seems to me that the president was willing to give up an awful lot here to get those oil prices down. How do you see it? Well, I think that's true. I would know that gas prices are falling for the third week straight still elevated above $4, but certainly not what they were at the high of 2022. But I share Elliott's skepticism that he's really going to get this resumed passage in this straight. I think quite clearly what Iran wants to do here is continue to treat it like its own private lake and that the question is really not what does the deal say is going to happen, but what is the status quo in the straight? after the deal is signed. And this pedantic distinction between fees and tolls is almost comical, right? I mean, is it a duty, a tariff, or a levy? What matters is whether there's traffic in the strait that can move without threat of being attacked by the Iranians or without paying a ransom note for that. And we've talked about this on the show a fair bit, but I mean, that example really matters for the U.S. interests not just there, but in the rest of the world about whether other hostile adversaries can take choke points hostage. So that is a really not just for the blow of oil.

That is a really serious strategic point that if the straight isn't reopened, it's a real defeat for the president. But before the war, there were no feet. There were no tolls. That's the preflow of traffic based on the traditional rules of international waterway. Open passage for all shipping. Significant difference. It is a significant difference. But I guess, you know, another thing we're hearing a lot of today is, you know, look at what we made them do. We closed the straight. Look what the president did. You know, and I think. we really just learned something that already existed, which is that the Iranians had this ability to close the strait and we're willing to use it. I don't think it's really, you know, the product of our action. It's really just underscoring what that threat was more than creating a new one. We're going to take a break. And when we come back, we'll talk more with Kate and Elliot about the deal with Iran when we come back. This podcast is brought to you by Altana AI. Altana's AI brings governments and businesses into one trusted network, so compliance gets proven, enforcement gets smarter, and goods move faster across borders. Learn more at altana.a.a.a. I'm Matthew Hennessy, the editor of Free Expression, the new daily newsletter from the opinion pages of the Wall Street Journal. Free expression is a little different than what you get in the print paper's opinion section. We've expanded things out a little bit. We have a great mix of columnists, including Matt Contenetti, Louise Perry, and Kyle Smith. You also get frequent sharp contributions. from my editorial colleagues. And we publish outside contributors too, from rock star economists like Tom Soul to real rock stars like John Androsic and David Drayman. You can sign up for free expression by going to the journal's homepage and looking for the free expression tab. We're also on substack, Twitter, Instagram, threads, and TikTok, if that's your sort of thing. Sign up for free expression today and we'll see you in your inbox tomorrow.

Welcome back. I'm Polgy Gold here on Potomac Watch with my colleagues Elliot Kaufman and Kate Odell. Let's move to the nuclear side of this, which, of course, the President has stressed from the very beginning, I think rightly. The June attack, joint attack by Israel and the United States, that is a year ago, really degraded significantly their nuclear program, buried the three main sites in significant fashion, buried, we think, the enriched uranium, not all of it, but most of it. But the President has said in the wake of the recent... bombing that started in February. Look, we want a couple of things. We want no enriched uranium in Iran at all. We want that out. That means not just the highly enriched uranium, but all of it, because even low levels enriched at 5% can be relatively quickly boosted to weapons grade. We want a commitment not to enrich anymore. And we want intrusive inspections about the dismantling, which we also want of their... nuclear sites. In other words, we want to end to the evidence, the capabilities of their nuclear program. Trump is getting none of that in this deal, Elliot. Instead, Iran has said, okay, we'll negotiate over the program without many specifics. Is that your understanding? There's just not many details about what they will talk about in this deal? That's right. And President Trump himself said it's a little conceptual. this deal, this preliminary deal. And when it comes to the fine points of nuclear inspections, materials, facilities, that doesn't work. It simply doesn't work. Yeah, a little conceptual sounds like a little vague. Yeah. And I think you put it in proper perspective because Iran's nuclear program right now is as weak as it has been in two decades, in 20 years, meaning Iran is not enriching uranium. Iran's key facilities have been smashed and it's stockpile of enriched. uranium is inaccessible, buried underground. Now, they could try to access it, but we are watching. So that's all to the good, and that is a result of Israel first and then President Trump second, showing the will to use force like no previous U.S. president would. So that means something. But in exchange for stopping military strikes on Iran, we thought we would get the real nuclear concessions. Instead, we got a ceasefire that dragged on for weeks and weeks while Iran was still firing every couple of days. Then we thought, well, we have this economic blockade of Iran. So in exchange for getting rid of that, we can get the nuclear concessions. Instead, we are now giving up the blockade and we're not getting the concessions. We're getting

promises to talk more about those concessions. The one very specific promise we're getting is words. Iran's saying, we do not pursue a nuclear weapon, but they've always said that while doing precisely the opposite. They signed that promise in the Nuclear Not Proliferation Treaty, which they later violated, which they violated entirely, lied, cheated, covered it up, all of it. And so I don't credit. that promise. There will be some wording about agreeing to resolve the situation with Iran's enriched uranium. I am very eager to see precisely how that is worded. And this refers to the stockpile. The stockpile. Because if they are agreeing to destroy it, well, then that is something and we can work out details. But if they're merely agreeing to come to some unspecified agreement, then That means nothing. Kate, you know, unfortunately, I've had to deal with this issue for many, many years. And it appears to me that the Iranians simply are not going to make concessions on the nuclear program. They simply refuse to do it. They will give you nice words. They might even make some kind of accommodation where we can say, oh, yeah, you can come in and inspect this or that site at our timetable when we allow it. But they are going to insist on enriching uranium. They might even agree and say, oh, well, we'll not do it for five years or something like that. But you can't credit that, it seems to me, given the track record of this regime. Right. To be clear, I don't think in this current document we're discussing, they're agreeing to anything, any of the things you suggested, right? They're just agreeing to have a later conversation about some of those subjects. So it's even weaker than that. One other thing that I, just to put on the bulletin board of lies that the Iranian regime has told about what they do, this deal doesn't even purport to do anything about Iran's ballistic missile program. And Iran has always advertised that they limit their ballistic missile range to a certain amount. And then during this, military action. They fired a ballistic missile at Diego Garcia that went almost twice as far as the advertised range. I mean, it's just whatever they sign here is completely meaningless. But that ballistic missile program I bring up, too, because it's just one of the many thorny issues that is not going to get resolved in this discussion. And it was a core reason the administration gave for attacking the regime. I mean, I think the numbers... Brad Cooper, the Central Command Commander, has said that the numbers of ballistic missile production before Epic Fury was going up on a pretty steep curve and that we were producing, you know, six, seven interceptors a month, and we were worried that eventually they were going to be able to overwhelm us with those ballistic missiles and use them as a shield around their nuclear program. So this is not a peripheral issue at all. And it's just one of, you know, take your pick that is the regime lies about and we're going to be no closer to solving from this document that we're discussing. missile question going to be put off, apparently, for some regional discussions. Who knows what that means? But I would expect it means not much will come of it because Iran wants that missile capability to be able to threaten the region and deter a potential next military action. Trump would be inclined to go back there.

Let's talk, though, Elliot, about this issue of relief versus sanctions. The vice president, JD Vance, mentioned it in that clip we showed. He said they'll be able to join the community of nations if they make more concessions on the nuclear program. If not, they will never have the resources to rebuild. I think he said the nuclear program. On the other hand, Iran says they're getting 12 billion in assets, frozen assets from overseas right away. Now, the U.S. doesn't concede that, but Iran is saying they will. They clearly get oil reform right away. And Iran is also saying the U.S. has pledged no new sanctions as long as these discussions are going on. And if you assume, as I do, that that 60-day negotiation will be 60 more days and maybe 60 more after that. Certainly there's going to be no real action before the elections, I think, on the president. So, you know, they're going to get a lot of revenue from oil sales. And they're going to be getting things that they did not have before the war. You know, it would be one thing to return to the status quo ante, but Iran did not have a license to sell its oil. free of sanctions before the war. They could now get that for 60 days of nuclear talks. But it's hard to see us using that as leverage saying, well, that will end and then we will restart sanctions enforcement when Iran can say, okay. If you renege on that, we will then renege on our commitments in the Strait of Hormuz. So we could be dealing a real blow to U.S. sanctions enforcement going forward. That's number one. Number two are these billions of dollars held in the Gulf states, which are right now frozen, and they are Iranian funds. held in restricted accounts, meaning they can only be spent on certain classes of humanitarian goods, buying food stuff, medicines. Okay, so that's humanitarian, but at the same time, money is fungible. So if Iran gets access to that money and can use it on humanitarian goods, it can use its other. funds on weapons, on proxies, on all the rest. So that's major sanctions relief. And if Iran is getting oil revenues is getting these billions of dollars as well during this period of nuclear talks, well, it has every incentive to drag out those talks, number one. And it's hard to see it making the major concessions on these very thorny nuclear issues when it wouldn't make... those concessions beforehand, even when it was under a severe economic blockade. So I worry about rescuing the regime financially, but I also worry about undermining our own leverage in these second phase. We are going to take another break. When we come back, we'll talk about the domestic political impact of this deal between the president and Iran when we come back.

This podcast is brought to you by Altana AI. Altana's AI brings governments and businesses into one trusted network, so compliance gets proven, enforcement gets smarter, and goods move faster across borders. Learn more at altana.a.a.a. Don't forget, you can reach the latest episode of Potomac Watch anytime. Just ask your smart speaker, play the opinion Potomac Watch podcast. That is, play the opinion, Potomac Watch podcast. From the opinion pages of the Wall Street Journal, this is Potomac Watch. Welcome back. I'm Paul Gicot with Kate O'Dell and Elliot Kaufman here on Potomac Watts. The Daily Podcast, the Wall Street Journal Opinion. Another question is what impact this deal will have on Israel? There's the regional allies. Israel is highly critical voices in Israel about this Benjamin Netanyahu is publicly quiet. but seeking a meeting with Donald Trump very fast, we hear. But the Gulf Arabs aren't as vocal in criticizing this, but obviously they have an enormous stake, Kate. And how do you think they're going to react here? to this deal, which I assume they think will strengthen Iran in terms of the money it will have to rebuild its industrial base and missiles. Well, look, I think they're going to size up the deal. And if they conclude that the United States is not serious about accomplishing its aims and denying Iran regional power, then they're going to have to make some kind of accommodation to Iran. And that's really regrettable because I think the Iranian attacks on civilian targets in Dubai and other places. was a wake-up call about the Gulf states and their strategy of kind of trying to play both sides of the United States and Iran. And so I think this is an opportunity to continue reshaping the Middle East. And so I think that is one of the real risks for the president and signing what amounts to a really bad deal. And just, you know, to add one quick point on the sanctions, I mean, I think reading the obituaries today of the campaign, there's this, all of this, well, you know, the president had no choice. He either would have to really escalate or sign a deal. deal that is unsatisfying, so he should sign the deal. And I think the blockade, just taking the blockade off, it's just giving financial CPR to the regime. And I think that blockade had really not gone on very long. It was denying them hundreds of millions of dollars a day. And so I reject this narrative that, you know, he only had the choice of basically committing ground troops or giving up. We really do have a lot of leverage from that naval blockade. We are running and continuing it through Labor Day, like the president said, we were going to. That was a way of denying the regime resources, and now they're going to get it. I think one of the ironies here, as I see it, on the Gulf Arabs, is they're likely to either demand more American commitment, security commitments.

coming out of this deal, or if those aren't forthcoming, they'll decide they have to do some kind of accommodation, as Kate says, with Iran. What about the Israel? I mean, over the weekend, the president attacked Israel for responding to Hezbollah, trying to hit one of their, another of the Hezbollah's headquarters in Lebanon. And he was basically was saying, well, he said, they have the right to defend themselves, but they shouldn't do it at the sensitive time when we're trying to get a deal. The fear in Israel is that they're going to be hamstrung and how they respond to the proxy attacks on Israel. That's right. And from the Israeli point of view, they see it as, you know, they've been fighting alongside the U.S. and have in many ways been leading the fight, you know, fighting alone for 11 of the 12 days of the war in June 2025. And this time around, fighting equal to. or in terms of airstrikes, more so than the U.S. in this war, and then they end up with the short end of the sick here, not even being told what's in the deal, just being sort of handed it. And when it comes to Iran's proxies, these are terrorist groups sworn to Israel's destruction sitting right on its border and shooting at its towns and cities every day when they shoot. back at the terrorists. Now they get scolded. So it doesn't make sense to them and they're trying to figure out desperately how it ended up here. Now, they are determined to not give up their right to shoot back, not sort of give Hezbollah in Lebanon, carte Todd Blanche. So they're going to do that. But they are worried about Iran saying, If Israel shoots back in Lebanon, the whole deal is off. And then they hear about it from President Trump who could back Iran's... interpretation. Now, he's done that to secure this deal. Whether he does it to keep the deal going forward is an open question. He doesn't have to, but I think he could face that question far sooner than many people think he could face it this very week before the deal is even officially signed in person. Well, and if the negotiations are going on and he wants to achieve certain goals in the negotiations with Iran, he could conclude that maybe he needs to lean on Israel more, which will end up with a confrontation no matter who's the next prime minister of Israel. It's one of the things that there's going to be an election in Israel later this year, Benjamin Netanyahu may not be guaranteed a new term. One of the things that's striking, though, about the reaction in Israel is it's really criticism of this deal across the political spectrum in Israel. Kate, one of the reasons we supported this Iran policy, we thought it was useful to go after the nuclear program, for sure, degrade that, but also restore American deterrence after the Biden years to show that when an American president says something, it will be followed through. What does this deal do?

to that restoration project for deterrence. What do you think? Well, I mean, a couple of caveats, one of which is that Friday is a long time away in Trump's universe. He likes to test. He likes to test things out and see how they do. I'm reserving some amount of judgment until there really is something signed because we've seen this show get renewed for a lot of seasons. I also think a deal that really caved on its major objectives and allowed the strait to become a toll booth, net failure for American deterrence. If the straight is open and there is some hope of a nuclear negotiation, I think it moneys the water. And I think that's one thing that I think is. important to keep here in mind is that I'm not prepared to conclude yet that this entire excursion was a mistake for American deterrence and that we accomplish nothing. I think degrading their industrial base, their drone industrial base, their ability to fire ballistic missiles for several years and trying to get some progress on the nuclear front is not nothing. And I think The status quo before the strikes was also not sustainable. And it was not stable the way, oh, you know, it was a stable world and Trump just went in there and struck a rent. I think that's a completely false narrative. I also think real quick... that Chinese and Russian supply military equipment really underperformed in this conflict. And that tends to radiate to other conflicts around the world. So I think it has the potential to be a net failure if the straight becomes a toll booth. But I also think what we see here is it's kind of a mixed strategic bag that everybody is going to have to try to price in and read in the rest of the world. There is also the domestic political implication, Elliot. The president obviously thinks that getting oil prices down. We'll help his standing politically, will help the Republican Party in the fall, help the view of the American public's sense of his economic stewardship. But how is the deal itself going to play? Apart from that, Republicans and the Congress will welcome that. On the other hand, there's a lot of them who are hawks on Iran have been for a long time. We're going to be very skeptical of this, I think. I know a couple, talk to a couple, and yet they're wary of speaking up publicly about it. But one point that I do hear expressed is that Congress should get a say here. If the president negotiate a final deal with Iran, whatever those terms are, needs to be scrutinized by Congress and go to a vote. And that's actually U.S. law. So it really should. Obama avoided it. Exactly right, exactly right. He got away with it. And otherwise, that deal probably would not have passed. President Trump may try the same, but I think he's going to have a harder time. Now, this deal, I expect, he's going to be savaged for it. In the press, certainly.

And all the Democrats who were calling for him to get out of this war as fast as he could are not going to suddenly give him credit for doing so. No, they'll say you sold out to Iran, which is preposterous by their standards because they wanted to ignore the nuclear problem at all. And they're going to pivot immediately to saying how much of a failure this all was. And if Republicans don't have a counter narrative there, which they can really... believe on how this was a victory, well, then I think the Democrats' narrative, supported by much of the press, will probably win out. Kate, I wonder what you think the White House and the president are thinking here on the political impact of this. Leave aside the oil price issue for a second. Do you think that the president is thinking, well, you know, I angered my mega base, the Tucker Carlson podcast crowd, isolationist crowd, by starting this conflict with Iran. And this will get me back in their good favor for at least for a time. It'll help me with that part of my base. Meanwhile, the other hawks, they will not speak up because they don't want to. They don't want to get on my bad side. I mean, the president can denounce us all he wants because we don't care. But if you're a senator, they do care. When you see Vice President JD Vance entering the scene, you know, that it's designed to send a political message to that first group you were talking about, like, you know, don't worry about this, guys. We're going to bring this to a close here. And so I think that's true, but two things. One of which is just sometimes in the middle like this where you, if you end up not getting what you set out to get, is not a good place to be politically. I think in public opinion on foreign policy suggests that, you know, you can't win an election on foreign policy, but you can lose one. And if the public feels like... he expended all of this effort and didn't get his core objectives. I mean, what was the point of that? I don't think that is a winner politically. And that's why I think... re-engaging might be a better option for him, even politically and even with his sustained gas prices. But also, I just think on the politics, on the hawks, the defense-minded Republicans in Congress, you've started to see the president's influence there. I don't want to say Wayne, but I think they are starting to find their voices and speak out on some subjects like withdrawing troops from U.S. troops from Europe, unilaterally, as the administration has tried to do. I think there is a willingness to speak up there because some of these issues are profound important. So I guess I'm a little bit more willingness to stand up to the president, but pick your spots, you know, pick things where there's something on the line that matters. I think a terrible deal with Iran would certainly rise to that level. Well, we shall see. Personally, I think the president is determined to end this conflict and that the ceasefire is going to evolve into what essentially is an end to the war and an extended negotiation, so called, over the nuclear program.

And then we'll see where that goes and what criticism the president gets or support. Certainly he's going to get some applause from the G7 members he's meeting in Paris this week because those guys all want the war ended and oil prices down for the sake of their economies. All right. Thank you, Kate, the bachelor, Adele. And thank you, Elliot Kaufman. Thank you all for listening. We are here every day. I'm Tomocwatch. This podcast is brought to you by Altana AI. In a fracturing global order, how do we collaborate more, enforce more, and trade more all at the same time. You build an infrastructure of trust. Altana provides it. Compliance verified at the product level. AI powered visibility. Intelligence shared across borders without compromising sovereignty. The future of trade is trust. Altana, the network for trusted trade. Altana.a.a.