The "Stop Cap" Edition
Showing mention at 39:33 — highlighted below
Transcript
203 segmentsYou've got social dialed in. Search is doing its thing. So why do your marketing results look the same as six months ago? That's because you're fishing in the same pond as everyone else. Podcast listeners are a different audience entirely, more engaged, harder to reach through traditional channels, and ready to act when someone they trust makes a recommendation. We're ACAST, and we put them right in front of you. Browse thousands of the world's leading podcasts, book host reads or run your own ads, and track every conversion in real time. Same skills you already have, brand new results. Acast.acast.com slash advertise. Kate, I feel like you're about to hype me up. on a music video or something or should be wearing like a large clock. What's what's going on with the trucker hat? I like this. I like this kind of vibe. It's a little throwback, I will say. It's a little throwback. It's a little Kate hasn't been showered yet this afternoon. That's, you know, what can I say? It's early afternoon in your defense. That's okay. It is early afternoon. It's pretty of young children. Yeah, I have young children. I'm like coming down with something. I'm like kind of, but the hat is a gift that I had printed for a group of TAs in my property class. And it says, I. was a TA in Clonix property class and all I got was this stupid chattel. And so there's a double entendre like pun there with chattel and hat. And there's like, you know, there's kind of just like a bad joke about like, you know, about property law and terminology. But yeah, so this is what I'm, so that's what I'm wearing today. It has a little bit of a, there's a moment, I don't know if anybody, if you all are sports fans, were like Brian Robinson, who was the running back for the Washington commanders, had like a giant hat. I was trying to get a thing started where they were advertising hats that were like five times the size for a normal head so you can have big advertising on. And that's what that hat demands, I feel like, because you have a full run-on sentence on the front of the hat. It needs more real estate to really take full advantage of it. Yeah. You know, the kids are saying these days that something's cap if it can't really be believed, it's BS. I feel like it's great to have a big hat on hand to be able to put that on anytime someone is capping. This is going to become Ben's new thing. We have to be careful about spreading ideas around like this. He jumps on these things very quickly. Don't I know it? We're like, you know, five years into dog shirts. And that all started with in lieu of fun. I'm really sorry to everyone. That is an entirely a K-clonic problem. I will say that we know where the fond of this came from. It was fine. I thought he was just doing it for the show. And then all of a sudden, they're just everywhere. And now Molly may have just expanded our demographic into the Gen Ziers. So this is great. You should practice doing that through the whole episode.
Hello, everyone, and welcome back to Rational Security, the show where we invite you to join members of the Lawfare team as we try to make sense of the week's big national security news stories. I'm thrilled to have some of my colleagues back on the podcast to talk over a couple of big national security news stories that we are following this week. First off, joining us is Lawfair's senior editor returned. I think back after a little bit of leave, none other than Professor Kate Klonic. Kate, thank you for coming back on the podcast. Great to have you back on. It is so fun to be back. Wonderful. And join us as well as Law Fairs Public Service Fellow, one of Law Fairs Public Service Fellows, I should say, Troy Edwards. Troy, great to have you back on the podcast. I think it appears number three-ish or so now. I'm happy to have you on. Thank you so much. Good to be here. Three-rounding. I don't know why you would ever round two, three, but somewhere in that vicinity at least. And joining us is, I think, officially a RATSEC regular now Lawfare Senior Editor, Molly John Roberts. How does it feel to be elevated to the regular scene? You know, I think this means it's like SNL when you go to a featured player status. That's what you've accomplished here. And I hope you're as proud of that as you should be. Yeah, I think I've peaked. Yeah, exactly. It really doesn't go anywhere from here, I could say. That's why I've been doing this for five years because it doesn't seem to change. Why don't you get that status? But regardless, I'm thrilled to have you guys on. We've got a lot of kind of disparate stories and disparate corners of the national security ecosystem, percolating, all of which seemed like it was worth spending some time on, and we thought we would pull together this crew of folks with very different interests and focus to talk about it. Our three topics for this week. Topic one, misanthropic. On Monday, Anthropic filed a civil complaint in the Northern District of California and a petition for a hearing at the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit over the Defense Department's designation of it as a, quote, unquote, supply chain risk. Litigation caps off weeks of building tensions between Anthropic and Pentagon officials over the firm's two ethical red lines for the Defense Department and its use of its AI model clawed, specifically setting around widespread surveillance of Americans and the use of AI and autonomous weapons. What exactly is the Pentagon's grounds for designating Anthropic supply chain risk, and how does Anthropic argue that doing so is inconsistent with the law? And what might the implications be for the AI industry as a whole? Topic two, the Machotian candidate. I was trying to find an Iranian city that starts with capital M. There's really, there are a couple. This seems like the most obvious one. None of them are super well-known. I don't know it's the best one, but it works for these purposes. Fears that Iran might respond to the ongoing Israeli-U.S. military campaign through overseas terrorism has come to a head this past week as reports emerged that U.S. intelligence has detected an encrypted message being transmitted from Iran that some believe may serve as an operational trigger for assets sitting outside of the country. What do we know about Iran's involvement in past clandestine operations, including terrorism? And what does it mean that this is all happening at a moment when the Justice Department and FBI have lost so many of their experienced national security personnel? And topic three.
Maricopocalypse now. Maricopopocalypse now. There we go. I practiced that one, and I still failed at the first end. There's just too many consonants in a row. Federal investigators have ramped up several inquiries that seem to be aimed at longstanding and thus far unsubstantiated allegations of fraud in the 2020 election that are particularly popular with President Trump and some of his closest supporters. Last month, FBI agents executed search warrant on Fulton County's election office and confiscated ballots and voting equipment used in 2020. Last week, the FBI reportedly subpoenaed records from a conservative Arizona legislator over the state senate's audit of the 2020 election results in Maricopa County. And days later, the Department of Homeland Security's Homeland Security Investigations Office, or HSI, requested records from Arizona state officials regarding their own investigations into alleged 2020 malfeasance. What should we make of these developments, and at what point should we be concerned about the federal government's engagement in these sorts of matters in advance of the upcoming 2026 midterms? And, of course, the 2020 general election beyond that. For our first topic, Kate, I'm going to turn to you on this very messy dispute that has now emerged between Anthropic and the Department of Defense. It came to a bit of ahead last week, but of course it came to ahead at the exact same moment that the Trump administration decided to engage in a large-scale military campaign against Iran that remains ongoing, which we're going to talk about the second topic. So we had to spend last week dealing with that. And the week that we kind of held on to this topic, it has ripened a bit. We now have not one but two legal actions. filed by Anthropic, one administrative, one more conventional federal court action, contesting what the Defense Department has done, which is to designate as a supply chain risk, this authority that's usually used against foreign companies, often foreign companies with strong nexus to foreign adversarial, if not hostile foreign governments, now being applied for the first time, to my knowledge, to a U.S. company. Talk to us about... What is exactly the basis for what the Defense Department is claiming for being able to do this and how anthropic is challenging? What sort of actions it's pursuing and arguments it's making to try and reverse this action? Yeah. So I'll just kind of back up just slightly and kind of just, again, just kind of remind everyone set the state of like how we got here because it did kind of get folded into everything with Iran, which I don't think was a total accident. that these things were kind of simultaneously brewing at the same time. The fight between Anthropic and the Pentagon is really a fight over who gets to kind of set the rules for military AI. And the DOD, DOW has basically said that, and brought big of the supply risk because its clawed model has ethical guardrails and limits on certain kinds of lethal uses or mass surveillance of U.S. citizens in particular. And they wanted the company to set those aside. They were dictated. But Anthropic had in its government contract terms that kind of broadly set that they were allowed to set these kind of ethical guardrails such that they were. And so.
Based on that kind of language, anthropic pulls out, since we're not going to kind of remove these. There's this brinkmanship. I want to kind of just briefly point out something there that I think has been under discussed in the reporting of this, which is that this is, there's not really guard. There's not, there's no specific standard of, like, build the fence this high or we know exactly what will happen if, like, if we allow this to take place. This is in a lot of ways. in my belief and kind of with the intelligence that I'm kind of like surveying from people that are in Silicon Valley and abroad is like another part of kind of the smash and grab before the midterms of like just trying to get out there and take as much and go as far the administration to go as far as it can on kind of creating like setting the stage and taking executive power over these types of contracts and over this type of tone and how AI gets set up with the belief that if you kind of do this and you set this out and you, you know, and I think that even a few months ago that they might have had more success with this, and Anthropic wouldn't have pushed back as much, that if you set this out that there's going to be kind of an ownership and a path dependency that happens over this, that will be hard to reverse course on. The code gets written. Things get kind of built up into the system, and so that happens. But in all of that, there's kind of this bring friendship back and forth. Anthropic says, no, we're not going to do this. DOW says, okay, we're going to label you a supply chain risk. And, of course, Anthropic filed suit on Monday in two different jurisdictions. They filed suit in a civil complaint in the Northern District of California with five different claims in their complaint. around the contract dispute and First Amendment violations. They also filed for a TRO. And then on the same day, they filed in the D.C. Circuit. And so they filed in the D.C. Circuit to challenge a supply chamberous designation. So that's what's happening. And what you are seeing, interestingly, is a lot of advocacy groups and other frontier models and other engineers and other technical experts deciding to write amicus briefs. deciding to already get out there and kind of join this fight. And so it will be very interesting to see how this unfolds over the next couple of weeks. Microsoft has already filed an amicus brief on the TRO in the Northern District today. And a number of engineers from OpenAI, Microsoft, a bunch of different places, all filed at amicus yesterday in support of Anthropic, who's represented, I think, mostly by Wilmer Hale. in the Northern District civil suit. And then I, you know, we know that like there's, you know, the Center for Democracy and Technology, uh, fire and a button, you know, ACLU, a whole bunch of kind of like kind of predictable players are going to be reaching out to kind of battle it out over whether or not there are First Amendment arguments. Whether this is a pure contract dispute or whether this has kind of no, you know, and then there's also like the pure public law part of it with like the national security part of it. So anyways, it's just going to be like a host of different really interesting issues. So Molly, I know you listen in on the hearing that took place on this yesterday. Tell us a little about what you heard. I believe there's a Northern District California hearing, as I recall. Talk to a little about how the court.
engaged with his arguments approach these things. And notably, here's my understanding, although Kate, Molly, correct, if I'm wrong, you basically have the Northern District of California pursuing a bunch of mostly constitutional claims, maybe some broader APA claims. I have to go back and remind myself where the APA clips fell, but basically challenging the whole implementation and seeking an injunction about stopping the implementation of this particular action. Then you have the specific statutorily provided review process, more of an administrative process, but going through the D.C. circuits. specifically challenging the basis for the designation of the supply chain status. Is that about right, Molly? And that case, which arguments do we see focused on in the court hearing you heard yesterday? Yeah, it's about right. So yesterday was just a status conference for the Northern District of California case and the judge there. It was mostly about when should they have the hearing. Anthropic wanted it sooner. The government wanted it later. Anthropic essentially won out on that partly because the government wouldn't commit to taking no additional retaliatory actions in the meantime, which Anthropic said it was worried about. The reason they filed in two places is because there are two statutes that the government cited in its letters to Anthropic. designating it a supply chain risk. And one of those statutes, Congress has routed all cases regarding designations under that statute to the D.C. Circuit. So they had to challenge that one there. And then the other one and the what Anthrop is calling the public directives, which are the. public statements, including the tweets or posts or exes or whatever you want to call them, from Donald Trump and Pete Hegseth, challenging those in Northern California as well. So these will be proceeding in parallel. They're going to try to have both of them proceed quickly. The D.C. Circuit one is happening a little later than the other because part of the process for that statute requires them to first ask for relief from a government agency and then be denied. So they ask for relief from... Pete Hegseth. Interestingly, it's Anthropic versus Department of War. Anthropic is being very... diligent about saying Department of War, not Department of Defense, which is kind of funny. I went to a case last week that was the New York Times versus the Pentagon for press access stuff. And that was Department of Defense, aka Department of War. And the lawyers there were not saying Department of War. But in any case, that's what's going on. That's why it's in the two courts. And they didn't get to the substantive. issues in this status conference, they just talked about when they're going to have the hearing, which will be on the 24th. So, Troy, you know, you've been, obviously a practicing lawyer, a different area of law than some of this stuff, but I'd be curious about if you have thoughts about how we see the attorneys, many of them are former government attorneys, many of them our folks law fair knows of various stripes involved with this case, how you're envisioning their kind of approach to this. Molly described a little bit of a cautious approach around framing.
Tone Department of War, obviously, like, a kind of non-adversarial take on that very weird optical front, but one that certainly the government seems to care about, and that rings a certain way. Given that the kind of culture war background, you know, what else would you expect to see about how anthropic is approaching this sort of question? And maybe not just in the strictly litigation context, but also in the kind of broader public messaging and broader framing and other activities context. I'd be curious if you have a sense of that. Yeah, a related point I've been wondering about is how the parties are going to handle their out-of-court statements. So in most of these districts, including California and D.C. Circuit, they have local rules that govern what the parties can and cannot say outside of a court once a matter begins. A lot of that is to make sure that you're not, you know, if it's a jury trial coming up later, you know, you don't want to pollute the jury pool. But it's not limited to that. Once it starts, there are local rules that often govern. and restrict what they can say on the matter. That's going to prove to be relatively difficult here, I think, for the parties, just based on the historical nature of the relationship. I mean, for a week or two there, at least a week, we saw the CEO of Anthropic, Dario and the head of DO, W, or D, consistently basically send messages back and forth across the bow, right? There was a public statement or essays written by Anthropic. There were statements by DoD through some of their... relevant individuals, relatively sharp in tone from DoD and soft in tone from Anthropic, which is, I think, a nature of what we're going to see play out in the litigation. So, Kate, let me come back to you on kind of the broader sort of industry implications of this, because we've seen actually a pretty strong reaction, I think, across the different frontier labs and of other people engage with the private sector elements of AI. That's, I think, carefully couching their criticism of this to some extent, but clearly concerned about it, objecting to it. I think avoiding saying anything too hostile, the Department of Defense, Department of War, but nonetheless, obviously having clear reservations understandable because this obviously is a major federal intervention in the industry and federal intervention in a parallel company that they could see that coming back on them. But what are the broader ramifications for, you know, the industry and how it approaches either defense type of work and how this fits into it? Other defense technologies, frankly, the Defense Department often operates on the assumption that it's such a central part of the market for the product that it can dictate a lot of terms. But that's not as clearly the case here, it doesn't seem to me, in regards to Claude or any of these other models. So talk to us a little bit about the market and kind of broader industry dynamics around the case. Yeah, so this is, I think it's kind of interesting. I mean, if you've been following AI kind of breakouts and kind of the conversations, if you've been like kind of at conferences or doing anything, I feel like all I've been kind of hearing is this kind of vibe of like they're so powerful. This could be so bad. We have to do something. But there has not been. I just really like, it's been, oh, it's been really frustrating for someone that, like, kind of craves, like, rigor because there has just not been any rigor around what the threat is or, like, what could go so bad. And I think that this is actually, in some ways, in incredibly useful and hopefully, like, like, good pause button to kind of show us what actually the threat is. And here's, in my estimation, one of the threats that kind of was revealed by this.
These frontier models are like burning through compute at like an incredible, incredible rate. I think that there were numbers that were just published that said that Anthropic is spending $3,000 on average over, like subsidizing by $3,000 every user of Claude right now. So like a month, like that's just crazy. Like that's crazy levels of compute. And so they're not, I mean, and no one's going to be paying $3,000 right now anyways. People are not going to be at a consumer level paying $3,000 for to use Claude. So this is kind of like, who is this product for? Who's going to be buying this product? Who's going to be using this incredible product? Claude is clearly like the best in has kind of emerged as the leader. And there is questions of like whether the six-month reprieve was that Elon Musk and Grok could try to like get up to speed in some type of way. And that's a terrifying thought because it's such as it's such an inferior model. But. Cloud is really powerful. And it does seem like kind of what I'm hearing when I'm kind of talking to people at the companies and things like that is that, yeah, they need government contracts. Like this is, like that is the race. The race is to kind of establish who's going to be the government contractor and getting built in at a really foundational level into those systems will be is seen as kind of like once that code is kind of like in the system, you're going to have a hard time. untangling it. And so, I mean, I think that that is kind of what we're seeing. Now, with those kind of constraints in place of like what that kind of threat is, we can see very clearly that like, oh, okay, you think that you're just going to be able to control this and, like, you're just going to hand over all of your code, all of your capability, all of your compute, everything to the government, and we'll just have the super weapon of AI to use however we want, or we can build a super weapon of AI to use however we want. And you have a supply chain that's basically like, or like our anthropic that's like, no, you're not, we're not just going to do that. Like, we're not just going to kind of do whatever it is that you say we are still private entity. I mean, I think it's like one of the first kind of real, real moments where we know what actually, like, what the constraints are and what like the risks actually are, like what they're what we're actually going to kind of be risking long term. And it's for the litigation just to kind of put like a little bit of a point on this that the litigation coming through and everything else. there's, I mean, I'm sure that in Ratsack people are familiar with the idea that speech is code from the Bernstein case and the idea that this is like, you know, that asking, there's an argument that like that you can say that it's happening or not, but that basically in the government compelling anthropic to not code things a certain way or to code things a certain way, that they are compelling speech and that is a First Amendment violation. I mean, the opposite thing is that like,
If the government contracts with you for printing services, you don't just like tell the, like, you don't like the color of their posters. You don't just not print their posters. That's on a First Amendment violation. It's a contract dispute. And so there's a lot of kind of, I think that there's a lot of kind of. really heady problems, both kind of from a NATSEC perspective and a really practical perspective about which model ends up becoming, like, there's just so much path dependency and like which model ends up becoming the one that gets kind of the main DOD contract. And I think that the secondary argument will be the secondary kind of real, like, question that we're finally getting is like how are we really thinking about code how are we really thinking about the constitutional protections of code is it conduct is it product is it you know is it speech And how does that play out across a million different areas of like civil litigation and constitutional protections and the copyright and all types of other things? So anyway, so that's kind of a big sprawling. But if you can believe it, that's actually a more cabined kind of what can AI, like how can AI ruin us than we've had for, I would say, the last year and a half? Well, so let me pull you in on this, Troy, just because I want to get another lawyer's perspective, because I look at this array of claims, and I come to a slightly different conclusion that sounds like you're coming down this case, which is like, I look at, okay, you've got these background constitutional claims, due process First Amendment claims. I have trouble seeing that many courts actually eventually reaching them at any point. So it doesn't seem like we're going to have much clarity here because the statutory administrative basis for what the Defense Department seems to have done in this case really seems like pretty weak to me. I mean, this is an authority that obviously has never been used against a U.S. company. It pretty clearly seems to be intended for use against foreign companies. It's not even applied to things like... deep seek and like other like foreign AI models, right? It's just being applied to this one case that strikes me as like a real uphill battle to justify even in a zone like national security where usually the executive branch gets a lot of deference. Am I off on that, Troy? I mean, how would you feel if you were the government's lawyer going in and this is the record you had to defend its conduct off of? Not great, particularly because mechanically, I'm now wondering, can I not use Claude and can the other side use Claude in drafting my briefs and litigating? Am I limited to lesser models now? But your question is well-taking, which is probably legal in nature, and I think I would not feel great there either because, one, I think the court, I think you're right. The court is going to...
want to avoid constitutional questions, which is a constant doctrine of the court, right? You know, we don't want to get into these meaty constitutional issues if we don't need to. Let's turn to the statute and the facts before us and determine those issues. And if those are determinative, then we can resolve it there. I think that's as far as the court's going to need to go here. I think the court can dive into the statute, dive into the facts leading up to this analysis and resolve it. Now, Another reason I wouldn't feel good being a government lawyer here is you run a significant risk of creating bad case law, right? And you mentioned the deference that the court offers to a lot of to the executive branch and national security issues. I think there's an important reason for that deference. Lawfare recently put out a good article written by a number of NATSEC former officials that say judicial deference is still important in national security cases. But the deference owed to the executive branch is rooted in history and comes from a pretty good default of expertise in the executive branch. If the executive branch here leans heavily on that deference, I think a court is likely going to create some pretty bad case law by deciding that that deference isn't due here, given the raw analysis and how... I think incorrect it is on the government side. Yeah, I mean, it's been a kind of extraordinary record. I say this as, you know, a post-9-11 generation national security lawyer where the assumption was the executive branch would get, and after 9-11 did get really substantial deference on all sorts of fact judgments, all sorts of policy-laden determinations. But we see now courts from the Supreme Court on down pushback on determinations regarding, you know. To some, well, it's that short interpretation still bears in, to some extent, in the learning resources AEPA context. We have second guessing in, like, certain immigration context, alien enemies act cases. You have second guessing in a number of the other cases saying, well, we're not sure executive branch if we can fully buy into your assessment of these in the domestic deployments cases. Like they said expressly, yeah, you actually do get a lot of deference. And even with the substantial deference we give you, multiple circuit courts said, executive branch, you're just not meeting the burden in this context, right? And while the Supreme Court didn't vindicate that on that theory, like those holdings are still out there. The circuit court weren't told, oh, you should be applying a much more generous standard of review. So it's just like it's difficult terrain to operate on, I think, if you're the government. So Molly, let me come to you on that. Like, why are they doing this? Because it does seem like they're going to lose. And I really think that was our colleague Alan Rosenstein. wrote a piece saying, yeah, this designation isn't going to survive first contact with the law from my, what limited reading and I've done, and I'm frankly intending to do more in the next few days, like it seems right to me. It's really hard to see how this survives. So what is the goal here? And insofar as this is just part of a broader effort with broader motivation, what other parts might we see emerge in the days and weeks to come in addition to this, you know, initial designation? Yeah, I mean, I think that it is. theater to a certain extent. There's a lot of talk about theater within the AI community too, right? There's talk about it all being security theater when the AI companies make these statements saying that they do have prohibitions on, like Open AI, for example, saying that it does have prohibitions on mass surveillance and then people looking a little closer and saying, actually, this is just any lawful use. But I think it's also theater on the side of the administration here and that
Really what happened was Anthropic, first of all, saying specifically, no, we're not just going to go right ahead with everything you want, Pete Hegseth, and then Pete Hegseth feeling like that was... uppity of Anthropic to have the gall to suggest to him that it would tell him how he should run his department and how he should be using or not be using technology. And I think he just kind of took umbrage at that or Trump took umbrage at that too. I think that's really a huge part of it. And then I think there's kind of the broader culture war sense that Anthropic is the woke AI company, which is certainly how it's been positioning itself. You know, Dario Narendra Modi has not been shy about criticizing, for instance, in a recent essay what ICE was doing in Minnesota, whereas Sam Altman has been fairly deferential to the administration and the, and Open AI, other executives have been donating to Trump. So, I mean, I think that that that is some of it. I think that it's a posturing, signaling kind of thing. So, yeah, I mean, I think it's difficult to know exactly what they'll do next. I think that, again, to the extent that they can make these public statements that show, wow, we're going after Anthropic. That's probably what they want mostly to do, because I think they also don't really, and certainly not anyone further down the food chain, who has any knowledge of how Anthropic is actually used at DoD, would not want them to stop working with Anthropic. I mean, would not want them to do anything to cut off more quickly. For instance, their ability to use these models on which I think they do rely pretty heavily, because like Kate said, They're the best. And in fact, that's partly why the national security rationale is so bogus. You saw that they want to keep using this if they can, as long as they can. And they initially said they were going to invoke the Defense Production Act because Anthropic was so important to national security, not a threat to national security. So I think they put themselves in a tough spot in terms of what they want to signal and in terms of their actual operational needs. Yeah, it is obviously important and fascinating case. We'll have to see where it goes. I have a feeling we're going to have opportunities to revisit and discuss it more in the future. But let's move on to our second topic for now. And that is the question of a different sort of retribution from a very different corner of the globe. We are, of course, now in week two of an ongoing Israeli-U.S. military operation against Iran, a wide-ranging one that has really substantially decimated Iran's already fairly weakened security apparatus.
taken out its supreme leader, potentially in a variety of other security and political leaders around the country, continuing to target various aspects of infrastructure, overseas maritime assets, as we saw a naval vessel get hit by U.S. submarine, Office of Sri Lanka last week. And Iran has been responding. not quite in kind, but in a similar kind, with a barrage of rockets and drones across the region hitting not just military targets, but also a variety of civilian targets as well. And what I think is fair to describe as a very indiscriminate set of attacks, or if it's discriminated deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure in various points. But, you know, the one thing we haven't yet seen that has always been baked in to the assumption about how Iran's going to respond to these things is... overseas terrorism. We've seen Iran engage in this sponsoring it in the past. We know about the famous attacks on synagogues in Central America and South America 10, 20 years ago. It was tied to Iran the Pam Bondi Beach attack just last year in Australia. Australian officials have tied that to Iran in various degrees. So there is this inclination. There is this... tool in their toolkit that they have used in the past. We haven't seen it brought out yet. But now we have these reports about this encrypted radio signal being broadcast around, which I should say there's some, a fair amount of flack around exactly what this means. I think our former co-host, Emeritus Shane Harris, wrote a great piece on this in the Atlantic, kind of breaking down, debunking at least some of the confidence about what exactly this means. One possibility, at least, is the idea that, oh, they're signaling to these overseas assets, these kind of Manchurian candidate sleeper agents around the world. Hey, gloves off, time to start doing things. Troy, I want to come to you on this first because you have helped prosecute, you know, different elements of the kind of broader global Iranian apparatus as a prosecutor. I know you're working with some colleagues now looking at some of these patterns, what Iran has done. Talk to about... What Iran's historical pattern of this sort of retribution has been and how this latest set of developments may fix into it? Like, why aren't we seeing this sort of response? Is it something we're likely to see? You know, what is the broader Iranian pattern and of practice in this sort of area? So the toolkit that Iran has and that it's pulled from historically is pretty diverse. So just zooming in on kind of a five or six year period from the U.S. strike on Qasem Soleimani, the former general or commander of the IRGC Quds Force, which is the military apparatus in Iran focused on external operations, that just zooming in on the period following that attack from the United States shows the diversity of this toolkit. Iran has facilitated murder for higher plots and assassination attempts, both on the homeland and in European countries when our government officials travel. And we can talk a little bit about some of those specifics. They've engaged in affirmative cyber attacks on United States infrastructure, both civilian and government. And then they engaged reportedly in election interference in the 2024 presidential election. And those are just three of the smaller examples that the
G.C. and Iran engages in when it has this long-term memory to respond to U.S. aggression or other countries. And that's to say nothing of their operations in other countries. And Matthew Levitt actually has a really nifty tool to use an interactive map across the world to focus in on all of these Iranian external operations efforts. So just that's zooming out. That's just the toolkit that they could pull from the... Second question, just in terms of why we're not seeing it now, I think it's important to say that Iran has a long memory, and we're only a week or two into this. And at the start of these strikes on Iran, the president, President Trump said that this would likely take up to four weeks. It could probably take longer, but he guessed about four weeks. I think that should factor into why we're not seeing the certain kinds of asymmetric attacks on the home front or otherwise yet. I think it's because there's potential that Iran is playing a game of attrition here, allow the U.S. and Israel to run out of munitions or to run low on stockpiles, and then try to inflict political pain on both. the U.S. and Israel. And one way to do that is to wait and then surgically approach with an asymmetric approach in the United States home front to make the political cost on Trump and his administration increased significantly while they were replenishing stockpiles. I don't think we should rule that out. Just because we're not seeing it now, it doesn't mean it won't come in the near future. Hey folks, Scott R. Anderson here. It is officially hot here in Washington, D.C. The kind of hot where biking to work means arriving, already regretting your life choices. Or the only sane afternoon plans involve shade, something cold to drink, and anything other than jeans. Luckily, Quince has you covered for the season. I mean that quite literally, because half the trick to surviving a D.C. summer is having the right lightweight stuff in rotation in your wardrobe. Personally, I have been living in their organic, cotton, cool, Max Gino shorts this month. Breathable, comfortable, and somehow still presentable. When I'm actually biking and running around, their ultimate commuter shorts have become my go-to. They move with you and don't fall apart after a few washes. And their pro-peak performance pillow has quietly become my favorite warm weather shirt. Look sharp, but breathes enough that I'm not melting into my chair. And when the weekend rolls around its pool time with the kids, I'll admit, I've gotten a lot of mileage out of their Italian swim trunks. Genuinely nicer fabric and fit than I expected for swimwear. So good, in fact, that I just bought another pair. The best part, Quince works directly with ethical factories, cutting out the middleman markup so you get real quality without the premium price tag. So beat the heat this summer with Quince. Go to quince.com slash security for free shipping on your order and 365 day returns. Now available in Canada, too. That's Q-U-I-N-C-E dot com slash security. Free shipping and 365-day returns. Quince.com slash security. Now, let's get back to the show.
Ready, set, summer with the Honda Summer event. With available features like all-terrain tires and off-road tuned suspension, the rugged Honda pilot, bridgeline, CRV, and passport. Have all you need to get summer ready with the most fuel-efficient full-line automaker in America. Visit your local Honda dealer today. See dealer for financing details. Based on EPA estimate of 2024 large full-line automaker fleet wide fuel economy, EPA Automotive Trends Report 2025. You've got social dialed in. Search is doing its thing. So why do your marketing results look the same as six months ago? That's because you're fishing in the same pond as everyone else. Podcast listeners are a different audience entirely, more engaged, harder to reach through traditional channels, and ready to act when someone they trust makes a recommendation. We're ACAST, and we put them right in front of you. browse thousands of the world's leading podcasts, book host reads or run your own ads, and track every conversion in real time. Same skills you already have, brand new results. ACAST.ac.ac.com slash advertise.
So after the Soleimani killing, we know there was an effort, like kind of publicly stated, intent to take revenge on behalf of Soleimani, to avenge Soleimani by the Iranian government. That was, again, stated fairly publicly, widely reported, and did have real elements, although none of them really came to fruition. So can you tell us a little bit about what we know about what that effort looked like, what it consisted of? and, you know, where it came from. We know there was, of course, the immediate Iraq barrage against a lawsuit air base in Iraq, which did injure somewhat fairly badly, a number of U.S. service members, but not direct, I mean, mostly as a result of the concussive force, they were undercover. So a fairly significant attack, President Trump decided not to respond to that, and therefore that kind of limited the most direct hostility. Then we had the, what had been ongoing, and then increased after that hostilities with different. Iran-back militias in Iraq. But let's take that out of it. What about the broader global picture outside of Iraq and the region? What do we see around try and do? Why didn't it succeed? What part might have succeeded? And what does that tell us about what they might try and do here? Yeah, so I think there's a pattern, though, and even though we're excluding it, I think it's relevant to say that Iran often works through its proxies in the region with these kind of more immediate military reactions to U.S. interests in the region, and those proxies give it both this kind of space for deniability, which they almost always do after the attacks, but they also then allow them to funnel just through finances and logistics to these other groups and to maintain their stronghold on those proxies. The reason I highlight it to answer your question is it's actually a similar process that plays out in the asymmetric approach that Iran has to reaching into the U.S. home front. So, for example, in some cases, post-S. Soleimani, when Iran reaches out to, you know, for example, attempt to assassinate a dissident that had fled Iran and had criticized Iran's regime in the post-Solomani time period, Iran has reached out to... criminal organizations, organized criminal organizations in other countries, including, for example, a partnership you may never have guessed, Hells Angels out of Canada, which there is a Hells Angels faction in Canada. I did not know that before this case, but Iran has this reach that extends not only to these kind of... you know, more prominent terrorist networks in the region, but these criminal organizations in the United States and around it. So, for example, in that case, they reached out to Hell's Angels through encrypted platforms and arranged this murder-for-hire plot to travel and attempt to murder a dissident in Maryland and that dissident spouse. The same thing in New York, when they reached out to an Azerbaijani faction of the Russian mob with some members that lived in New York City, and they organized another murder-for-hire plot in Iranian dissident. in the New York City area. And then scale upward in terms of targets, post the Soleimani strike, Iran both publicly stated, but then actually acted on attempts to murder or assassinate national security officials in the Trump One administration. And so that would include an individual that was charged out of D.C. that attempted to.
arrange for an assassination on John Bolton, who was then the National Security Advisor during that time period. And then there was a second payment or an offer from that same target to pay even more money to have then Secretary of State Mike Pompeo assassinated. And then, you know, add to that when Mike Pompeo traveled to Paris, a book that was published last year. described details around an Iranian attempt to assassinate Mike Pompeo in a hotel in Paris. And again, this is four or five years after the Soleimani strike, all evidencing this long-term memory that Iran has. And even though there was that immediate aftermath of a strike on a U.S. base, you know, and it was successful in injuring a number of U.S. servicemen and women, it shows that Iran has higher hopes and a long-term memory to kind of attack these folks that were directly responsible for the strike. We should be concerned about the immediate aftermath, and we can talk about the diminished capacity for us to defend against it. But this is a concern that folks should have for the foreseeable future, I mean, years into the future. Yeah. So I actually, I have a question in that really quickly, if I can cut in. So, Troy, like, I'm hearing a lot from people that are saying, like, what a great time for us to have completely dismantled, like, all of the FBI staffing. And the decline in DOJ personnel and everything else, right, as kind of we ramp up all of these efforts that create exactly the types of threats that you just described. So, I mean, can you just say a little bit more about that? Yes. So, you know, and just to kind of amplify the concern, as Iran's infrastructure and the IRGC's infrastructure in Iran is diminished by some of these strikes from the U.S. and Israel, it's possible they start to shift to kind of a loss calculus. of risk acceptance as opposed to risk aversion. So before these strikes, and maybe even a little bit before the June 2025 strikes from the United States on some of the nuclear facilities, Iran was in a place of risk aversion, right? They have a pretty strong foothold, although it started to weaken post-October 7th retaliation from Israel. They had a strong foothold in these proxies. Now, as they start to lose that foothold and they lose the capacity even in their home front, they may shift to a risk. tolerance model of decision making because of how much loss they've incurred. And so what that means is they may be backed into a corner where they may react a little more aggressively. And that aggression can kind of look like a number of things. One, it may just look like Iran putting out public statements that motivate lone wolf type attacks, individuals who are in the United States and sympathetic to the Iranian cause and sympathetic to the damage they're confronting. In fact, it was pretty soon after The strike started on February 28th where an attacker in Austin, Texas, shot up and killed, I think, multiple individuals at a nighttime area of Austin. And I know it's still under investigation, but the public reporting is that he had some kind of Iranian paraphernalia or shirt design on. And so, you know, you have to worry about... That, just the messaging coming out of Iran to radicalize. Out of 330 million people, the risk is non-zero and increasing that someone is going to take to that cause. And then there's the more Iran-sponsored attacks or networks from their intelligence apparatus, that although they're weakened in the United States, they're going to have the ability to reach out and connect to folks in the United States and elsewhere. And Scott, you mentioned this. I think it's fascinating. There is this kind of reporting going on both in the Atlantic but in the ABC News about this number station.
And it's actually chilling. I have the audio. I don't know if it would come through. I can play it. I actually have a recording of the audio that's been broadcast over 10 times over the course of the last week. Oh, interesting. I might try. It's 20 seconds. If you don't, I mean, let's... No, let's try it. Steve, how, six, six, how, six, how, six, how, how, So basically, it is a 22nd clip where the individual says in Farsi, you know, announcement, announcement, and then a string of seemingly random numbers. The reporting is suggesting it, and I thought there was great reporting out of the Atlantic, as you mentioned, wondering, what is this? Is this Iranian origin? Is this a signal to folks like sleeper cells in the United States to activate them? And I think it's good. you know, question to ask. There's also some reporting that there is an Iranian origin jammer. trying to jam this signal all the way out to Canada. And so that's a pretty strong jammer and effort from Iran to potentially block this signal. But then it's pretty quickly shifting to another radio frequency. And so there's still speculation about whether that's Iran doing both and trying to kind of cloak whether or not it's them or them sending out the message or them sending out the blocker. And then there's ABC reporting that seems related to the same number sequence that's going out. that says that there's a government alert out to law enforcement agencies that provides a little more detail that says that they believe it's likely of Iranian origin, the sequence of numbers, and potentially related to a message out to these folks who will attack in the United States, all to say. It's a really important time to have a robust national security apparatus to deflect against these kinds of attacks. And we are, unfortunately, at this time, at a weakened state of a national security apparatus. And if you take these kind of tools we've talked about, the murder-for-hire plots, the espionage attempts, all the way to cyber attacks, the various agencies that are responsible for guarding against them have all been diminished. You've got the FBI's... counterintelligence task forces that are focused on Iranian counter espionage that Kash Patel fired a dozen or so of those agents and analysts about two days before the strikes began. You've got NSD, which has two litigating components, the counter export and boy, I used to call them the counterespionage section, and that's not actually what they're called, but the CES section. And I was part of CTS, so I hated on them kind of like the Yankees and Red Sox. And so, and then there's the counterterrorism section. both of which have been dwindled. I mean, it's reported that the head of counterterrorism section has been deployed since last fall as a member of the National Guard activated in the District of Columbia as part of that surge, and that it is down about 50% of its personnel. And same with CES. It's been reported that CES, the folks that remain have been focused on the Epstein redactions.
And so when you combine this FBI distraction and dwindling and the same with the National Security Division at DOJ, it's really concerning that the folks who may remain have their eye off the ball. And the folks who aren't there have removed the kind of institutional memory and relationships that are required to keep our eye on these kinds of sophisticated attacks from Iran. It really is pretty extraordinary. And I will say, I mean, this administration... I look at this, particularly at the overseas element, which I'm more familiar with from my professional background, and you look at the way they've been evacuating embassies and not essential staff. Or, you know, early on, before they launched the strikes, they started moving some non-essential personnel out of, you know, a day or day base and some of these other local regional base that they knew were likely to be attacked. I didn't see anything specifically about embassy Baghdad, but I mean, there aren't really non-essential personnel there anyway. Or there are, but there aren't like family members usually and stuff like that to move out. Now we've seen. You know, two weeks later, the administration evacuating huge swaths of embassies all across the region, all the way to Beirut, all sorts of other areas, all in response like what was anticipated to be the Iranian response to an action like this. This is not a surprise. People have been talking about this for a decade or more. Like, this is exactly what everyone of you asked. How is wrong going to respond? It's going to be to hit all of these targets, particularly in the region. The fact that they were this late to take that step, I do think is pretty disconcerting. I mean, like, I think it does say maybe they didn't think they were actually going to take the step to launch the scale of an operation. Maybe they thought they were going to do something much more limited early on, so they didn't think anticipate the sort of response. Maybe the decision was going to go on this long. Maybe the decision would just reach so quickly. it didn't get it to the rest of the bureaucracy where it was kept in such a narrow channel, it didn't get to the rest of the parts where people would know would say, hey, we did to start taking X, Y, Z step. But it does not speak of a lot of, like, the preparation that goes beyond the strictly operational side to these sorts of things, which is really disconcerting when you think about something that has a global knock-on effects, including potentially here at the home front, where again, as you say, Troy, we've had such a weakened apparatus. Like, it's astounding. And if something does happen, it should be a... massive political liability for absolutely everyone involved. And it's one that every people, like lots of people, a lot of other people I've been warning about for the last year as a consequence of what the administration is doing. And that's the predictable outcomes from the right. Exactly. Right. Those are the concerns we knew we should have going into an operation like this. Now think about the concerns we have. in the aftermath of this that we can't predict, right? Knowing which individuals may be traveling awkwardly or concerningly, knowing which way the money is going to go. And the folks who are responsible for tracking that and watching that have all either been fired or put in a position to be focused on other issues. And it's a really concerning, you know, model that will continue to exist as we see the government continue to beg for people to come back and fill these ranks and try and hire and fail to do so. So, Molly, I want to come to you, you know, as we could close in on closing out our conversation on this topic. Although, again, another one we're going to have opportunity to come back to. Talk to us a little about how the administration is framing this and how it fits into the broader.
political discourse, both around the Iran operation generally, but also as we're in this moment, we're approaching, you know, very important midterm elections. We know the president, as we're going to talk about in a minute, is doing things related to the elections. We know the president's trying to pass the Safe America Act desperately to the point that he's got John Cornyn flipping on the filibuster now in an effort to secure the Republican nomination for the Senate in Texas, right? That doesn't appear like it's likely to go anywhere, but it's still something the administration that he's basically laid out is his only legislative agenda. This all fits in an area where you see growing American discontent with the conflict, with the economy, which is being hit by the conflict, all these other factors. How is this going to be politically justified? And like, how do those different political pressures, do they tell us anything about what the tempo and pace of the operations are likely to be? Like, are we seeing a sense from the Trump administration of some waffling around this sort of stuff? Or are they finding other instrumental uses for these other factors? How is it going to be politically justified? I mean, I don't think they're going to succeed in justifying it politically. I just don't think it makes any sense for their base the way that they would justify it politically. I mean, it's not going over. Well, so far, it just doesn't seem like a very maga line to say, oh, well, the poor protesters. We love democracy. I mean, that just doesn't fly. The one area that I've been interested in, and this does tie into the elections, and I don't think this was totally on message for the administration, but Trump was tweeting, and no one else was saying this, but he was tweeting, Iran was interfering in our elections, so now we're going after Iran. And that was sort of concerning to me from the point of view of... election conspiracy theories generally, which have had a lot to do with foreign interference and the particular legal rationales that some of the kind of fringe actors in or close to the administration have been floating around taking federal control of elections, which have to do with this is a national security emergency. We have foreign interference. And I think that those are pretty bad arguments. But I also think that there's slightly easier arguments, and certainly if you were trying to do this in a more legit way where you were citing specific statutes, there are slightly better arguments if you're able to point to a foreign adversary with whom you're in an armed conflict. And I saw an essay, I suppose, by Timothy Snyder, maybe today, that I think is a little... melodramatic where he was saying, oh, maybe, and this goes to the sleeper cells thing, where he was saying maybe it's to Trump's benefit to invite terror here because if you have terror here, then you can really declare a national emergency and you can deploy troops and do all those sorts of things that could interfere with elections. And again, I think that is perhaps a bit overblown and I'm not. suggesting that the president is trying to get Iranian sleeper cells to activate and attack American citizens. I'm not suggesting that at all. But I do think that there being some form of conflict is useful when it comes to alleging a national security emergency. I know that Kate has thoughts also, though, on the politics of this.
Yeah, no, I just completely agree with you, Molly, and I just kind of wanted to, like, kind of cut in. I have not, I'm not as skilled in kind of like the operations part of any of this or kind of understanding that side of it. I'm, you know, just a civilian in that sense. But I do kind of, I am watching the domestic kind of deployment. I'm thinking as he's saying all of this kind of stuff about election interference, that this is a message to his base. Like, that is 100% what. kind of the Maga base want to hear. They have, like, rallied around election interference and everything else, you know, since 2020. And that, you know, I think that, like, just today, like Joe Rogan said that the war in Iran is, like, a betrayal of, like, all of kind of the Maga base. And so I just, I want to kind of footstomp what you're saying and just kind of be, say, yeah, like, I think that this is a way to kind of just, it's just a manipulation of the message to justify the, like, the maneuvers. to the domestic audience that he is trying to please and kind of stem some of the damage, that this war kind of looks like he's kicking off. And I mean, I'd just say that I think it was the president that said just this week, which is, I mean, you don't want to become numb to this. When asked whether or not Americans should be concerned about a terrorist attack that would kill Americans after these strikes, his answer was, I guess. I mean, that's a... That's a phenomenal statement in the literal sense. Like, I can't, I can't believe that he, that that's our approach to the aftermath of these attacks, knowing that the national security apparatus has dwindled. Yeah, well put. Well, let us take a moment to pivot now to our third topic, and that is what Molly has already alluded to, which is this question of election investigations and allegations of election interference. Not looking forward to looking backwards, specifically in regards to that bet noir for President Trump and certain people around him, the 2020 elections that he lost to President Joe Biden. Molly, talked with a little bit about what we've seen of the last few weeks in terms of the Trump administration's. Maybe not pivot towards this issue, which has always been hanging out there as something they care about, but maybe move towards making more, taking more concrete steps towards investigating this and how it fits into some of these broader narratives around elections, fraud that we're seeing looking ahead to 2026 and 2028. Yeah, for sure. I think it's interesting that you say not looking forwards, but looking backwards because. Separating those two things is quite difficult in this context, I think. You're right that what we've seen in recent weeks has been literally looking backwards the raid of the elections warehouse in Fulton County where they left with a bunch of ballots and information about that election and then the subpoena to the Maricopa County official who is sympathetic to them and I think would have given them all that information anyway. Those are focusing on, again, conspiracy theories about the 2020 election that Trump lost. And Maricopa County and Fulton County both were, I don't know if you can have two epicenters, but they were centers of those conspiracy theories of that kind of fight. And there was a widely discredited audit.
that Republicans did of what happened in Maricopa County that, you know, when you really look at the facts, shows that there wasn't any malfeasance, but this appears to be the president trying to relitigate all of that. So you could say, all right, he's upset that people are saying he lost an election that he thinks he won or that he's saying that he won and he wants to try to. punish people, retaliate against political enemies, and also just prove to his base that he was right. But I think it's more than that because this is, to me, forward-looking as well. There are lots of actions the administration is taking related to the midterms, including trying to get voter rolls from a lot of states, which blue states have sued, red states have complied, and then also mulling. And I'm saying that loosely, but the president tweeted about trying to achieve what the Save America Act that seems stalled out in Congress would achieve by executive order. And so the Save America Act is... voter ID, voter registration. It's not, although the president has been saying a lot about this, making it sound like it is. It is not banning mail-in ballots, but he really wants to ban mail-in ballots. And then also stricter standards for voting machines is one thing that he's obsessed with. And he's saying, I can do that. by executive order. I have an irrefutable legal theory. And it seems like it's possible that this irrefutable legal theory could involve saying that there's a national security justification. And this ties into Fulton, we know more clearly, but may tie into Maricopa as well, which is that when they say the election was stolen in a lot of cases, these conspiracy theorists are alleging foreign interference. And Renee de Resta has a really great piece up on lawfare. just recently about kind of the top five of these conspiracy theories about foreign interference. But the idea is you allege there's foreign interference and you use that as a pretext to take executive presidential control over the elections, which is not constitutional. But that's kind of what they're thinking about doing. So when I look at those raids, I view them in this broader context of an attempt to rest control over the elections and achieve these Republican objectives that it doesn't seem like Congress is going to achieve even though. the only constitutional avenue for it is for Congress to do it. Yeah, it's interesting. Like, here's the part of this that I wrap my head around or have trouble wrapping my head around, although it may just be that I am like just inherently more skeptical of, you know, the utility of some of these things that have a messaging component, is that the president can declare all these actions. There's lots of people, at least certainly his camp, that already believe all these things are true. He could take a lot of these actions without doing these additional investigations. I don't think there's a much reasonable basis for believing the additional investigations actually in a yield evidence that supports his case for doing so. It could actually do the opposite. And if what he's worried about is ultimately a legal challenge to say that these efforts are unfounded or baseless, I'm not sure why these investigations actually put them in a stronger position to do that. They might help in the external optics to say,
These are actively under investigation. Like that gives it a hint of legitimacy. And this administration really buys into that, right? Like that we've seen him do that with a lot of these political retribution things like, well, you're under investigation for this. We're starting investigation into this. And that alone gives credence in their view to saying, well, there's a basis for us to take action around this. But I have trouble buying into the idea that pursuing these sorts of investigations actually helps build the case for these further steps. And I seem like it might actually weaken it. Because if they're going to tie and tie evidence, you know, their cases into evidence from these investigations, and it becomes a subject legal challenge, people are going to seek discovery for it, people, courts are going to want to look at it. And it's going to be harder to hide the lack of basis than if you just don't have that data to begin with. Troy, I'd be kind of curious about your thoughts about it. So, like, I'm approaching this as what I think of as from a litigation perspective from somebody who does not actually litigate things. So I might be totally off. But like, what does that resonate to you? Like, how do you see this investigations fitting into potentially an eventual effort to say, we're going to take legally controversial executive action around 2026? Do these help hurt? Like, how do this fit into that picture? I think it's going to hurt it. And like you said, but my take on it is, is that. When the Trump administration, particularly when DOJ acts on an interest for the president, they enter the halls of the criminal justice system into a courthouse. They then surround themselves by a bunch of rigid walls that close them in that are tied to truth. Right. So the criminal rules of procedure, the local rules, the court system, the ABA ethical rules. You erect all of these roadblocks to them being able to actually do anything with this information. We've seen that play out after Fulton County when Bears parties now file 41G motions, and the federal government gets bogged down in trying to justify that they can keep these records before they can do anything with it. Courts can pause them from being able to do anything with materials. We've seen this in an unrelated case with the search warrant for the reporter from Washington Post, where the government had to freeze and not be able to look at things. So all to say, when you enter this criminal justice system, it's a testament to our institution. The administration now is locked into a set of rules, policies, and procedures, all of which surround the touchstone of truth. And that starts to play out disfavorably when you wonder if this can lead to the federal government being able to take advantage of the information they're collecting in a way that's not envisioned in the criminal justice system. You know, another example of this would be, I suspect, there will be a number of limits to what the FBI can do with information that they collect by subpoena or by... search warrant. And if the government then turns around and uses the information pretty explicitly to erect a number of executive orders, I think there will be avenues for parties to challenge that as simple violations of the material that they've collected through criminal process. So I see this as they're presenting a number of hurdles between here and midterm elections being interfered with. Yeah, I mean, that's great to the extent that
you know, they continue to obey and listen to what the courts say. I think the scariest idea is, is this to some extent a test run? We're going to see what happens when we look at a past election and we go in and we take a bunch of ballots and we're going to see what happens in court and we're going to see what hurdles we have to surmount. And maybe we don't care that much about what we come out with here. Maybe best case, we get a bunch of kind of half. information, bits of information that we can then contort and that Tulsi Gabbard can put in her threat assessment and misrepresent in her threat assessment. But then if we use that threat assessment in the future with an active election to try to take a similar action, we know what the process looks like in court. We know where people are going to get in our way and then we can decide whether we're going to listen or not. We can decide or we're going to respond because we've had this test balloon here and we've kind of run the game already. I mean, I don't want to be apocalyptic about it, but that does feel like what you're talking about feels like kind of the best case version of it. And I think that's the worst case version of it. Yeah, that's a fair point. I'm heartened by the fact that even the Trump administration, you know, will get a court order from the Supreme Court, for example, on the tariffs and the most they've done so far as, you know, throw their arms up and yell that this is a desecrated institution, but then follow the order. Once we see a deviation from that practice, I'm with you, Molly. I mean, we're in trouble. Oh, I will say, I mean, here is the thing with our institutional system that I think is like, you know. Proven to be a real bulwark of stability in, you know, turbulent times is that... the whole legitimacy of the whole rest of the system actually following the direction of the person in charge is that they believe they were lawfully elected. Like, there's a reason for leave the president was not lawfully elected, and he nonetheless stays in the White House and appoints a new attorney general. Every criminal convicted in the federal government is going to challenge the appointment of that attorney general, which we already saw with Mr. Whitaker during the first Trump administration, right? That causes real problems. We're seeing it now with the different U.S. attorneys, right? okay, the federal government, you have a federal government he's in charge of, but they can't actually successfully currently prosecute anyone. Okay. And then like when you get to, you know, individual soldiers or individual, you know, civil servants where they're asked to do something unlawful, and then they face a court order to the contrary. And that quarter of the way says, by the way, like none of this is lawful. You have to have such a systemic control to dictate the influence all the way down consistently enough to actually simulate. and assume control of the system, that it just strikes me that I think maybe Donald Trump or when people think they have that capacity, but it's based off a very grandiose idea of their own popularity and significance and cultural, like, weight and heft that I just don't think carries out. I think it's more of a symptom of being in a, in a...
you know, an echo chamber ideologically than actual political or social or cultural reality. So, I mean, that'd be they don't try. I'm just not sure it's... I'm not as worried about that actually succeeding. I am worried about the attempt maybe in certain regards, but the effectiveness of it is such a downstream consequence. And I think, frankly, you look at a lot of, like, everyday Republicans who may go along with what Trump sets because he's popular and gets elected, but at the end, what have issues with is and see political fortunes that extend beyond their 80-year-old president and say, maybe I don't want to ride along with us. I don't know. I like, I'm... I am cynical about so many things, but the absolute collapse of democratic government is one where I, like, have trouble getting all the way there, how it gets there, as rocky as road as it might be. But maybe I'm two rosy, rose-colored glasses, a little small, deep Democrat in that regard. Sorry to end it on my little rant there. That's my inner institutionalist coming out. Oh, I'm good. I already had my rant. That's a great way to end. I think between your skepticism of institutions and my inherent. Well, I'm just torn. I mean, I just like, I don't know, right? The problem is that I don't know. That's like the issue. Yeah. Yeah. You could be right. And that's how it goes. And, you know, you could, they've been so weird about saying that they'll always listen to the Supreme Court. It's so weird to me that they have. and that they, you know, haven't, that, I mean, with the tariffs, it was interesting to me that the worst thing he said was that they betrayed their country. But it's just unclear to me at what point that breaks down. Is it a, oh, I'm deferential until it's about the election? I don't know. I just also just kind of want to say there's a, you know, that Thomas Edzall had like a piece. I just saw the headline of it and kind of briefly skimmed it. In the New York Times, it was about the smash and grab presidency reaching its apex. And I have to say I don't think we're going on the apex. That I agree with it. We're nowhere near the apex of that one. I think we're on our way to the final ascent, but I do not think that we're at the apex. And one of the reasons is because I think we're going to see increasing levels of desperation before them in terms. I really do think that they see the writing on the wall that they have a limited amount of time. The courts are starting to come through. I think that we're seeing. And when I say the courts are starting to come through, I think we're starting to see things that we always knew they lose. They've said that they were illegal. We've... taken them to court. We're getting district court opinions or whatever kind of, and they don't want to appeal them. We're seeing that from like the firms and other types of things. They don't want to create precedent that's longer than this presidency, frankly, in some type of way that hurts their chances at ever doing this again. And so this is, I think, something to kind of keep in mind to your point is that.
I think it's going to get a little worse, unfortunately, before it gets better. I think that this kicking off with Iran is, like, actually kind of like, I don't know, like the final day up to the top, like to the summit. And I think we're going to kind of be in it for the next couple of months. You know, I've had a similar thought where... Part of the concern I see that I have is folks are going to start realizing how existential it may be as they approach the midterm elections. Folks who are in the administration and cabinet are going to see it. And I'm curious if we're going to start to see some of the more fringe voices start to cry out that, you know, if we lose this election, you'll be prosecuted by a future administration and you'll be put in jail by a future administration. Not to say that as some kind of analysis, but to say that to fearmonger and make sure that they rally a group of folks who may act to infringe upon this election because they see it as a bit of an existential step. And so... The question then becomes, if that's true and we start to see that play out, how should, you know, the other side of this political apparatus respond? Should they, are we going to start seeing Democrats talk about, yes, we should prosecute these folks? Or are we going to see Democrats start saying, boy, we need to provide off-ramps for these folks to be able to step down and say, okay, yeah, this is too far for me. I've disbanded from, you know, the current administration. and here's what I've, you know, learned or know, or here's what I support so that way they can start to shift toward a more free and fair election. I don't know. I'm curious to see how the both sides start to react to one another as we get closer to the election, which feels like a vector. Yeah, yeah. All fair points. Well, last for us to dig into here in future episodes, we're at the moment. We are out of time this week. But this would not be rational security if we did not leave you with some object lesson to ponder over in the week to come. Kate, what did you bring for us this week? I brought my... Balkanization mug. Classic. I know. It's so great. Jack Balkans, like, original, like, legal analysis blog populated for a long time, largely by a lawfare favorite Marty Lieberman's kind of rants about the Bush administration, among others. But yes. And so this is from there, I think it was their 25th anniversary. I can't remember. But which is crazy to think that it's been that long. But yeah. Wow, indeed, indeed. Well, there you go. Congratulations, Balkanization. I think that was actually a while ago. This is the 25th anniversary, right? Yeah. Troy, what did you bring for us this week? Okay, I swear I didn't coordinate with Kate ahead of time, but mine is also a mug because last time I was on RATSEC, I talked a little bit about the firings of a bunch of friends and colleagues and our national security apparatus. I brought my ex-fed hat. Sadly, between that episode and my second appearance, there has been another slate of firings of folks who I'm close with in the FBI, and so I brought my ex-fed mug for those folks. There you go. Color scheme seems somewhat less cheery with the mug now. That's the trajectory of my emotional state as it happens. Yeah, indeed, indeed. Well, absolutely. Still a phenomenal logo, and I'll ever some things go out to a lot of those folks as well, obviously, wrestling with a difficult moment.
For my object lesson, I will say I was stuck in Union Station a few weeks ago where Union Station now has acquired a very hip and useful and cool little store that sells used records and used books, which if you're stuck in Union Station for like three hours, it doesn't really happen to me because I live in D.C., but it was just like a weird coincidence that I kept waiting for a train that never left while I was there. and peruse and picked up some, like, great albums, some great books. One of which I'm really enjoying and reading, and I had some weird poignance for this particular moment, I think. This is Barbara Tuckman's A Distant Mirror. I'm forgetting the subtitle. Let me pull it up so I can remind myself. It's about the, something about the 14th century. A distant mirror. Where did it go? The calamitous 14th century, that's right. Which is this incredible portrait of like one French kind of a state. over the course of about a century, a little over a century, mostly straddling the 14th century. But it's this incredibly deep, deep dive into medieval culture, the relationship between church and state and all these other things. And it is fascinating, really interesting, and completely brutal to read. It makes you appreciate just how improved you are in our modern day for all of our problems off of the issues they faced back then. And then there are all sorts of weird parallels where you read it and you're like, You could read this exact sentence about stuff happening today. It's so strange, just like how much people are still the same, even centuries earlier in such disastrous contexts. But it's a great read, and it gave us something that evidently called Tuckman's Law. I didn't know this. I looked up the Wikipedia entry on this, but I highlighted this quote because I think it's such a good quote from the book, which I'll read. which I don't know how to take exactly how this bears on anything relevant, but I do think it's just well done and interesting where she writes, after absorbing the news of today, one expects to face a world consisting entirely of strikes, crimes, power failures, broken water, main, stalled trains, school shutdowns, muggers, drug addicts, neo-Nazis, and rapists. The fact is that one can come home and in the evening on a lucky day without having encountered more than one or two of these phenomena. This has led me to formulate Tuckman's law as follows. The fact of being reported multiplies the apparent extent of any deplorable development by five to tenfold or any figure the reader would care to supply. I don't know how to take that in this particular moment, but it strikes me as both very useful and very true, at least historically. I don't know if that's true of like news reports, but certainly historically it's useful. But yeah, it's interesting. She has such a... It takes great joy in describing and researching really horrible things. That is kind of a useful skill at this moment. And with that, I'll turn you to you, Molly. Who brings a similar joy while covering terrible and merciless things here for us in the law fair? What did you bring for your object lesson this week? Yeah, I'm out of town, so I was kind of scrounging. I do not have a favorite mug, unfortunately. I am, however, in California, and I was thinking that I could. vaguely related to what we talked about in that the anthropic case is taking us to California. And so I have brought a very California item, although I think it's Southern California, but I just discovered the existence of because where we're staying, there is an avocado and chermoya orchards. So this is a chermoya, which is a custard apple.
So new fruit for everyone to try, although I don't know how easily you can get them at home. I could, I'll try to pull it open. All right, you can see. It's like all custody inside. Is it good? It's sweet? Let's find out. Scott is like, this is the muck-bedding rational security video we've been promising for years. It's finally coming together. I will say it's good. It's definitely tropical tasting. It tastes like an amalgam of many tropical fruits. If you have texture issues, like issues with weird textures, perhaps would not recommend. The custard apple might not be for you. I'm a friend to all textures, so I like this custard apple. Interesting. All right. This we have to go, this we have to go check out. I love it. Wonderful. Well, with that, that brings us to the end of this week's episode. Rational Security is, of course, a production of lawfare. Be sure to visit us at Lafair Media.org for our show page, for links to past episodes for our written work and the written work of other lawfare contributors and for information on lawfare's other phenomenal podcast series. While you're at it, be sure to follow Lawfare in social media, wherever you socialize your media. Be sure to leave a rating or review wherever you might be listening and sign up to become a material supporter of Lawfare on Patreon for an ad-free version of this podcast, among other special benefits. For more information, visit Lawfaremedia.org. slash support. Our audio engineer and producer this week was me of me. And our music, as always, was performed by Sophia Yan. We are once again edited by the wonderful Jen Patcha. On behalf of my guests, Kate, Troy, and Molly. I am Scott R. Anderson. We'll talk to you next week. Until then, goodbye.
Here's a tip for you. There's a podcast out there with fans waiting to be your next customer. They tune in every week. They trust the host. And that host wants to talk about brands like yours, in their own words, to their audience. The problem is, you just haven't been introduced yet. We're ACAST, where that introduction happens. As the world's largest podcast marketplace, we let you browse shows, see who's listening, and book host red sponsorships or run your own ads, all from one platform. Transparent pricing, real-time data, complete control. advertising on podcasts by visiting acast.com slash advertise.