The Uncertain Future Surrounding NATO

This message comes from Schwab. At Schwab, you can get everything from self-directed investing to full-service wealth management all in one place. No matter your investing goal, life stage, amount to invest, or know-how, you can invest your way with Schwab. shape the world order as we know it. Here is U.S. President Harry Truman at the founding of NATO in 1949. In this pact, we hope to create a shield against aggression and the fear of aggression, a bulwark which will permit us to get on with the real business of government and society, the business of achieving a fuller and happier life for all our citizens. But under President Trump, NATO's future is uncertain. Here's Trump on Fox News on April 12th. No, we have to re-examine NATO because they weren't there for us. And let me tell you, and I've said this for 25 years,

they weren't there for us, and they won't be there for us. The United States has spent the better part of a year telling allies, you're on your own. President Trump is threatened to annex Greenland, the sovereign territory of NATO ally Denmark, and he launched a war in Iran without consulting NATO allies. Now the president is asking for help securing the Strait of Hormuz, and European countries are saying, no way.

Later, we talk about what Trump has. ally Viktor Orban's defeat in the Hungarian elections means for NATO and global security. But first, how is the U.S. and Israel's war with Iran testing the alliance? And how would a U.S. withdrawal from NATO reshape global power dynamics? I'm Jen White. You're listening to the 1A podcast. We'll be back with more after this short break. Stay with us.

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BetterHelp's 26th State of Stigma Report surveyed 2,000 Americans and found that 85% believe getting support is wise, yet 74% say society discourages people from doing so. Don't let stigma stand in the way of support. Start therapy with BetterHelp. Visit betterhelp.com slash NPR. Welcome back to the 1A podcast. We're talking about the U.S. relationship with NATO under President Trump's second term. Joining us from Florida is Ambassador Kurt Volker. He served as U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine negotiations from 2017 to 2019 and as U.S. Ambassador to NATO from 2008 to 2009. He's also a distinguished fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis. Ambassador Volker, welcome to the program. Thank you so much. Good to be with you. And also with us is foreign correspondent Laura Jakes. She joins us from Rome. She covers military deterrence in European security for the New York Times.

It's great to have you with us. Thanks for having me. So, Laura, we heard Trump talking on Sunday there. What's the very latest we're hearing from the president about NATO this week? Well, he's been saying, why should we be spending trillions of dollars on NATO if they're not going to be with us in the Strait of Hormuz? And it's important to remember that the United States is not paying trillions of dollars to NATO. It's spending about one trillion dollars on its own Pentagon, on the American military, and its own security. With the United States pays to NATO

is less than a billion dollars in direct funding. That's about 15% of a money pot that all 32 members of NATO contribute to. But more broadly, as President Trump talks about NATO, it has just been striking to listen to this playout sitting here in Europe. NATO is not some external organization to which the United States is a benevolent donor

to further security in Europe and Canada. This is really not a NATO versus the U.S. type of situation. As you played during the Harry Truman comments from 1949, NATO was created in Washington. The United States is a huge player in NATO, with huge power in NATO. And as such, historically, it's been the United States

that calls most of the shots, the United States who largely sets NATO policy. The one time Article 5 was invoked, this is kind of the backbone of NATO, the mutual defense clause that says an attack on one is considered an attack on all. was by the United States after 9-11. But, Ambassador, Trump's disdain for NATO is not new.

Remind us where his criticisms began. President Trump's animosity is, as we just heard from Northern, it's not really grounded in what NATO actually is. So NATO is a collective defense organization for the North Atlantic area by treaty. That's what it's supposed to be. So if anyone attacks a NATO ally, we all respond. And therefore, nobody attacks a NATO ally, so it creates peace. That's the purpose of NATO.

President Trump is looking at allies not as members of NATO. He's looking at Italy, he's looking at the UK, he's looking at Germany and say, you know, we help you, you help us. And it's whatever Trump wants. It's, you know, I want to go attack Iran. I want you to come help me. There's nothing about NATO that talks about, you know, what you do outside of the North Atlantic area. and if you do want help like that, you need to talk to people, you need to consult, you need to develop a common goal, a common plan, and we haven't done any of that.

So his frustration is more at a human level, gee, I thought they were supposed to help us. They're supposed to be our friends and they're not helping, having really nothing to do with NATO at all. But, Laura, it's important to note that President Trump has criticized the amount of money NATO allies. I have contributed to the alliance, and we've seen some changes there. after his criticisms, just explain a little bit about what we're seeing NATO allies invest in that alliance now. Sure, if your listeners can bear with some kind of sticky ways of how NATO explains to all of this. So basically, under NATO guidelines, each member state is supposed to, up until last year, spend 2% of their GDP on national defense.

And that was the benchmark set in 2014. As of last year, only two-thirds of the alliance had met that. They'd had 20-odd, I'm sorry, 10-odd years to meet that benchmark, and they had not. President Trump came into office in 2025, although we heard it during his first term in office as well. He wanted allies mostly in Europe to spend more. And so he said everybody needs to spend 5% of their GDP on national defense. It should be noted that at the time that this was happening, the United States itself was not spending 5% of its GDP on national defense.

I see that Secretary Pete Hegseth has proposed a 1.5 trillion defense budget for 2027. If this, in fact, is passed, then the United States will hit that benchmark, but it's not there yet. But what this has done is created some divisions inside of NATO, because, you know, let's face it, there are a lot of competing interests for funding throughout NATO countries and indeed throughout the world. Money that is spent on defense can't necessarily go into education or health care or or housing issues that all of which are becoming huge, have been huge domestic issues with huge political ramifications across Europe.

So the countries have tried to get there. They have 10 years to hit that 5% benchmark. Some countries are already saying, no, we can't. we won't. And some countries are saying we're already there. But it is not going to be an across-the-board compliance, no matter how much NATO's leadership wants to present to President Trump that the alliance is trying to step up and meet his demands. Well, I want to focus on the war in Iran. The U.S. and Israel attacked Iran on February 28th. After the war began, President Trump turned to NATO for support. But those members have not been unified in their response to his demands. Some countries have allowed the U.S.

to use their basis in airspace to support operations in Iran. Others, like Spain and Italy, did not. Now Britain and France are refusing to help the U.S. blockade the Strait of Hormuz. So, Ambassador, having played the role you have, what do you make of this mixed response from allies to the U.S.'s request for help? What does it say about the view of the U.S. as a trusted partner? Well, there's a couple of pieces to that. One of them, to answer your question, viewing the U.S. as a trusted partner, they do count on the U.S. for security in Europe, but they remember just back in January, President Trump was talking about taking over part of a NATO country's territory, Greenland, and even willing to use force to do so, or at least

not ruling it out. So that is very jarring to Europe. And then when President Trump launches these attacks against Iran, they had no idea this was coming. They were not consulted. There was no discussion at NATO. There was no operational plan. Nothing at all. And then President Trump says, I don't need you, but you weren't there. It's very confusing to them. What do you actually want us to do? And they did, over the past couple of weeks, say, look, okay, let's get past our initial surprise and emotion. we actually do have a shared interest in the free flow of energy through the Persian Gulf, free shipping in the Persian Gulf. So we would be prepared to support an operation that would ensure that, that would secure shipping through the Persian Gulf. And President Trump had to been asking for that.

He said, you know, help us do an operation to escort vessels or to get, you know, get shipping moving. And then as they're putting that together, the British Foreign Secretary chairs a conference call of 40 countries to say, all right, let's work on what an operation like that would be. President Trump turns around and says, no, I'm going to blockade the Persian Gulf. So for European allies, free flow of shipping, helping secure things, yes, they can do that, their publics can support that. But then to go around and engage in an act of war,

which would be a blockade, is quite a turnaround for them, and their publics are not prepared for that. So the goalposts seem to keep shifting for them. it's very unclear what the U.S. wants them to do, and yet their interests are engaged and they do want to align themselves. And it's just been very difficult for them to do that. And meanwhile, as you pointed out, President Trump keeps saying it's not enough, it's not enough. Laura, very briefly, what do we know about how Americans across the political spectrum view NATO and its value?

Well, across the political spectrum and in Congress, there was wide bipartisan support for NATO and the United States staying in NATO. And to get out of NATO, any president would have to seek congressional support. And there's nothing to indicate that he would have that currently. I just also wanted to jump on something that Kurt said. Regarding Europe, European leaders saw the war against Iran as largely unlawful and unnecessary. Having said that, they have said that they will support opening the strait once hostilities are over. We have to head to a quick break. But before we go, read in Florida.

emails, if I were president, on day one, I would apologize to our NATO allies and reestablish our leadership position in the alliance. I would drastically cut military aid to countries that commit war crimes and dedicate more to Ukraine as it defends itself against Europe's and America's most dangerous adversary. When we come back, Hungary's election results and what it means for NATO, that's just ahead.

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Plus, earn unlimited double miles on every purchase and enjoy access to over 1,000 airport lounges worldwide. Capital One, what's in your wallet? Terms apply. Lounge access is subject to change. See Capital One.com for details. Let's get back into our conversation. We're discussing the strained NATO alliance. Is it a rough patch or the end of an era? Jim in Massachusetts writes,

NATO's been working well for decades. Our NATO allies came to our alliance on 9-11. The treaty is working fine. Don't let Trump hand over Europe to Vladimir Putin. Thanks for that message. Now, last week, NATO chief Mark Rudah met with President Trump in Washington. Here he is on CNN. This was a meeting between France.

because we like each other. I really admire his leadership. Alara, Mark Rutte is called the Trump whisper, but he's also been criticized within NATO for his friendly approach to the president. How are NATO member countries talking about the best approach to this administration? Well, it's really shifted over the last year and a half, I would say.

At first, people understood why Mark Rutte was kind of cozying up to Trump, The idea was that you catch more flies with honey than with vinegar. And so we saw Mark Rutte be very profusive in his support for President Trump. I mean, you just heard him there saying that this was a meeting amongst friends at the White House last week when, in fact, I think all indications were that it was a very terse and tense meeting between the two leaders. And after President Trump started speaking about his desire. to overtake Greenland, whether by military force or otherwise, it called into question, does NATO, actually, do European leaders need to take kind of a harsher, tougher approach with President Trump

to kind of set some lines and say, listen, this is not the way that you treat friends and partners? So the jury is out on which approach is going to be better or more successful. one certainly could argue that Mark Rutte's approach with his kind of handling Trump with kid gloves has not been as effective as perhaps he would have hoped. Ambassador, I'm going to tap into your experience here because allies have lived through the first Trump administration. They saw that administration's decisions to, you know, in the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement, withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement. then the Biden administration's efforts to reestablish some of those commitments.

But now President Trump is back in office. He's withdrawn the U.S. from dozens of international organizations and treaties, including the World Health Organization and for a second time the Paris Climate Agreement. Broadly speaking, how are NATO allies thinking about the leadership of the United States? The fact that, yes, there can be a new president every four years. but I think there's been the sense that there has been some type of consistency across those presidencies,

even as parties changed. How are they viewing it now? Well, it's a really mixed picture, and I think Laura did a good job of describing some of the European attitudes. But I would also say that those issues that you raise, those are policy choices of the Trump administration. European countries make their own policy

choices, and it depends who they elect as leaders as well. For 16 years, we just had Victor Viktor Orban in power, and I guess we're going to talk about that, and he made his policy choices. So they're not necessarily connecting, say, the U.S. position on the World Health Organization to European security and to NATO. They do view NATO as important. They want to keep the U.S. in. It's vital for their interest. They have the biggest war in Europe going on right now with Russia's war on Ukraine. So that's one thing. And then the choices of the Trump administration are another. They don't have a warm, fuzzy feeling toward President Trump, as Laura was describing. I would argue, though, that Mark Vuta's approach to President Trump has been the right one.

I think European leaders ought to be grateful to him because he is keeping that connectivity with a U.S. administration that is very difficult for them to stay connected with. and for example, when President Trump finally wound down his rhetoric on Greenland in January around the time of the Davos meetings, it was with Mark Rutte that he did that. It was not with the Prime Minister of Denmark, for example. So I think that that approach is important. There's a NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington who once said that his job is to be squarely in the middle of the Atlantic, which means his job is to be cold, wet, and lonely.

But, Laura, I think that that really lays out the significance of the U.S.'s role in NATO, that you have, Mark Rutte, really trying to keep the U.S. President happy, even as he's being criticized by other NATO members. Sure. But at the same time, Europe is trying to figure out what happens if Trump does either withdraw all the United States from NATO, which, as I said earlier, he just can't do the snap of his fingers, or if he does what some people have described as kind of a soft exit, which would be to withdraw American troops, weapons, presence from Europe. And sure, that could probably happen. but the United States stands to lose a lot, even with that kind of soft exit from NATO.

There are about 70,000 American troops currently in Europe. They provide a jumping off point to quickly respond to crises in Europe and the Middle East by sending weapons and troops very, very quickly. They gather intelligence close to Russia's border and close to North Africa. They are able to secure trade routes in the Arctic and the Mediterranean

and sea, and as we know, that's getting all the more important as China's maritime presence and exports surge. And most of all, they represent this huge deterrence force, and they project American power to the rest of the world by being there. Well, we got this from John, who writes, NATO is not really a defense organization. It has served as a block to maintain the economic and geopolitical fruits of Western European and U.S. imperialism. Ambassador Volcker, your response to that? Well, I'd say that that's simply wrong. It is a military organization, a defense organization. It's what the treaty says.

The treaty is presuming that the countries of the North Atlantic area are democracies and market economies, although we've had hiccups in that process as well with a coup in Greece or with a dictator in Portugal at one time. But no NATO is fundamentally about. security and then our interests do differ when it comes to other things in the world. European allies did not go with the United States to Vietnam. We did not fight with the French in Algeria. We did, however, have a shared interest in security of the United States. And after the U.S. went into Afghanistan without NATO, after a few years when there was a need

for a peacekeeping operation, the ISAF operation, we did build that out. and NATO allies did join and support that effort. And similar thing with, say, Kosovo or Bosnia, NATO helped provide power projection in those areas for security relevant to Europe, even though it's not required by the treaty. We also got this question from Kathy in Ann Arbor, Michigan, who asks, what exactly does NATO spend its money on?

Is it low on funds? I mean, Laura, I think we're getting a sense of that from the ambassador, but can you talk about the financial health of the? the alliance. Well, the financial health of the alliance depends on the financial health of each country that's a member. Again, the money that when we talk about this 5% GDP on national defense, that's on national defense. I think it's about $6 billion, I think, don't quote me on that exact number, that NATO requires for kind of its overhead, for its joint funding, for some of its military kind of planning and command and control.

But the bulk of funding that goes, that is, quote-unquote, NATO, is actually national defense spending by each of the countries. This is money that each country would be spending on its own militaries and defense anyway. Well, I want to bring another voice into the conversation. Anne Applebaum is a journalist and historian. She writes for The Atlantic, and she's also a senior fellow, at the Johns Hopkins University and the School of Advanced International Studies. And welcome back to the program.

Thanks for having me. Well, as we've noted, the U.S. isn't the only country grappling with its relationship to NATO and Europe. This week, Hungary also said its longtime leader, Viktor Orban. Now, during his 16 years in power, Viktor Orban dismantled safeguards in Hungary's democracy to President Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin. He was a reliable ally. He was a thorn in Europe side. He blocked votes on aid for UK.

Ukraine vetoed key decisions, but on Sunday, Peter Péter Magyar defeated Viktor Orban by an overwhelming margin. Hungarians turned out in the largest numbers since the fall of communism in 1989. So, Anne, first, what does this outcome mean for Hungary? For Hungary, it's a transition on the scale of 1989. Viktor Orban has held power for 16 years, and in the course of doing so, he did his very best to create a one-party state. So his party occupied the bureaucracy, the judiciary. He built a group of oligarchs who were reliant on government money

and who in turn funded foundations and universities and media, I should say, that were close to Fidesh Viktor Orban's party and promoted it. He built a network of think tanks in Europe and elsewhere. He built this state that was designed never to lose an election. election. And one of the things that seems to have happened is that he didn't expect the result to be as decisive as it was, and he didn't have a plan for what to do when that happened. And so he did resign, I presume he'll continue trying to regain power. But it's a, for Hungarians, especially younger Hungarians, who don't remember any other leader, it feels like a revolution.

Now, the focus of this conversation is on NATO. So, Anne, what does new leadership in Hungary mean for the country's relationship to NATO? It's also quite a profound transition. So for the last several years, the Hungarians have played the role of Russian voice, or if you want to be more unpleasant, Russian puppet in Europe. The Hungarians, as you said,

they've blocked European Union sanctions on Russia. They've blocked European Union funding for Ukraine. They've been a voice really against Ukraine and for Russia in all kinds of other fora. I mean, I suppose this matter. more inside Europe than it did in NATO. I mean, as your guests were just explaining, NATO funding is done country by country.

There is no, I mean, there is a NATO budget, but it isn't the most important thing, whereas in the European Union, there is a joint budget, there are joint decisions taken about funding, and Hungary was able, especially recently, to block that. Actually, this became a big issue in the campaign, especially towards the end.

There were some leaked transcripts and audio of telephone conversations between the Hungarian foreign minister and his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, and even between Viktor Orban and Vladimir Putin. And they were on the lines of the Hungarian foreign minister explaining what had just happened at a NATO summit, or an EU summit, excuse me, and saying, I'll send you the documents about that and seeming to be agreeing policy. Viktor Orban's conversation with Vladimir Putin, he said something about Hungary being a mouse to Russia's lion. And this became very offensive inside Hungary. And one of the things that happened in the last couple weeks of the campaign is people started showing up at demonstrations and shouting,

when you courageously stood up, like you did it in 1989, when you were the first to cut the barbed wire that was dividing our continent. So with this result, our union is stronger. Our union is more united. We'll talk about that a little bit more, but I first, Anne, want you to zoom out a little bit for us. Right-wing leaders around the world are generally hostile to alliances like NATO. And we've seen right-wing leaders around the world rally around Viktor Orban ahead of the election.

Marie Le Pen of France and Mattel Salvini of Italy just last week. U.S. Vice President JD Vance traveled to Budapest to rally for Viktor Orban. What do you think his defeat represents for the future of the far right and key global alliances? So Viktor Orban presented himself to that group and to the world as the leader of an illiberal democracy. And that was the language that he used. That's his word, his expression. And by that, he meant that he was a, he was democratically elected, but he was someone who was willing to take over the institutions of the state and also to use state power to impose his

cultural views, to impose his views on, to control the media, to control universities, control other sources of different opinion and other, and, you know, and other political parties as well. And he presented this as a model as a way to run. a kind of new illiberal democracy as opposed to a liberal democracy, and he had many followers. And you saw many of the followers come to Budapest in the last few weeks to support him, or else they did so online. Actually, Benjamin Netanyahu supported him. President Trump supported him, and as did many others. And so his loss is a loss for their sense of their projection of inevitability, their argument that we have found a new form of politics. We are connected.

to the real people. We are going to run our countries without the risk of ever losing. We're going to sweep away the old rules and the old idea that there should be competitive politics and competitive media, and we're going to dominate the information space. And the fact that he lost means a lot. It means that that form of politics isn't forever. Well, we have to take another break, but still to come, how do countries like Russia and China view the divisions within NATO. And what does it mean for the global order as we know it? We'll be right back.

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Philan Indianapolis writes, NATO is a valuable part of our national defense. Doesn't Congress have to ratify a withdrawal from NATO? Lara, you touched on this earlier that this would require congressional approval. But I want you to briefly remind us of that process, but also the practical logistics if the U.S. were to step out of the alliance. Right. So Congress has to approve it. It has to win, I think in the Senate a two-thirds majority to withdraw. And even if that were to happen, the United States would not be able to officially withdraw within one year. There's like a one-year grace period for that withdrawal to completely happen. Now, we touched on this a little earlier as well that if the U.S. stays in NATO, but effectively quiet, quits.

So they withdraw troops from European bases, stop showing up to the table, makes it clear that it will only act when its own interests are directly at stake. Ambassador, from your perspective, is that any different from formally leaving the alliance? And what would the alliance look like without its most powerful member at the table? Yeah, well, thanks, Jen. And let me comment on this a little bit more broadly, too. So what Laura is describing about a two-thirds majority required in the Senate for the U.S. to pull out, that's legislation that was passed before President Trump was elected to his second term, actually sponsored by Marco Rubio in the Senate.

He was the main sponsor. And a lot of people would look at that and say that, okay, it requires Senate approval. Constitutional lawyers would look at that and say, no, the Senate is overstepping its rights. It doesn't have the right to say you can't withdraw from a treaty. It has a constitutional requirement to approve entering a treaty, but there's nothing in the Constitution that says you can't pull out of one. And you mentioned a bunch of international agreements that we've pulled out of, and the Trump administration would very likely argue that we can pull out if we want to.

The Senate is overstepping. Because this is then a dispute between the executive branch and the legislative branch, this would probably have to go to the Supreme Court to adjudicate and probably run out the clock on Trump's administration. So there's a practical legal barrier there, I see, yeah. Very complicated, but that's it. The second point is that pulling out of NATO would be massively unpopular in the U.S.

The public would not support it. It's a gratuitous damage to American interest globally. The Congress would oppose both Senate and the House, Republicans and Democrats. So it would be similar to what we saw with President Trump saying he's going to attack Greenland or even with this war against Iran now. It is simply not popular and President Trump has to take that into account. That is how you get to the point that Lara and you were making about a soft exit.

Well, maybe we could just reduce what we do and we'll pull troops out, we'll close bases in Spain because we don't like the socialist government in Spain or things like that. here it's actually in America's interests to have these bases, to have this access, to have the platform for projecting power, to have the relationships with other militaries. And when we work with them the way we should, they do come with us and they do help out. So it's very much in our own interest. I think our own military is going to be skeptical about doing those kinds of things. Well, it's interesting you mentioned the military because we got several messages from,

veterans, and I want to play a couple of them for you now. I was a Marine in the 80s, working with NATO in Norway. NATO is essential to our security, to global security. I hope we stay members of NATO forever. And Dave is an Army veteran from Salt Lake City. NATO and the United States have kept peace in the world for 80-plus years. The fact that there are imperfections and stresses among nations is no reason to blow up NATO.

I have no use for the idea that somehow the United States should not be part of NATO. And then we heard from Andrew in Kentucky, who writes, I served over 30 years in active duty in the U.S. Army with eight years stationed in Germany. I also worked alongside NATO partners in Bosnia and Kosovo. What these NATO partners lacked in logistical capability was always made up in their tactical prowess and eagerness to partner with U.S. forces. Trump is making a real mistake in pushing away these allies, and it will cause long-term damage to the standing of the U.S. abroad for years to come. So, Ambassador, I want to hear your point about U.S. security, but I wanted you to do that against the backdrop of what we've heard from people who have served in our military ranks alongside NATO allies.

Go ahead. Yeah, absolutely. I think those veterans are exactly right. it would be very hard for the U.S. to do what we want to do for American security globally without the presence, the access, the alliance that we have with NATO. And clearly, President Trump is complaining right now about not being able to use airspace or bases in his attacks on Iran. And I think he has a point. I think that those countries could,

basically quietly find ways to support the United States without taking on those roles themselves. It is coming against the backdrop, however, of no consultations, no clear operational goal, and Greenland and everything else we talked about. So my recommendation to both sides would be stop the public sniping and sit down and talk about what we actually want, because I think we do share interests fundamentally, as we heard from the very. veterans about security for the United States and Europe and the North Atlantic area. But even in the free flow of oil and gas through the Persian Gulf, we certainly don't have

any love lost for the regime in Iran. We share other interests globally. But let's talk about them and come up with ways to work together rather than just publicly complaining. Laura, with that context, how is Europe preparing to rely less on the U.S. for defense? If that conversation the ambassador is describing there doesn't happen and we continue down this pathway, what is Europe prepared to do? Well, ever since Mr. Trump came back into office last year, there's been this, what I would kind of describe as an undercurrent, a very informal, very preliminary conversations about how Europe could take more responsibility for its security.

I mean, we hear a lot of public statements about it, but how that would actually be done has been a bit under the radar, you know, how allies could prepare operationally for what President Emmanuel Macron in France has called strategic autonomy. And that has gone from everything from like, you know, talking about how they could produce more, Europe could produce more of its own weapons, so it doesn't have to rely on American arms producers, how those weapons could be deployed. Chief among of this, of course, is the so-called nuclear umbrella

that protects Europe with American nuclear weapons. Britain in France are the only other nuclear powers in NATO, but their weapons, their arsenals are not big enough, and their national policies currently limit where and when they can be used. They haven't come up with an answer for how that would be deployed should the United States withdraw its nuclear umbrella from over Europe. They're thinking about what command and control would look like, how to divide authority among 30 often competitive allies in Europe

and the one in Canada. And there's a sense if this were to happen. The danger, of course, is that NATO could fragment into what's being termed as quote-unquote, mini-lateral alliances that are likely grouped by geographical interests, right? So what Eastern Europe and the Baltic states and the Nordic states want for security is going to be really different from what southern Europe

and the Mediterranean border states want, which is also very different from Canada's concerns. But I want to kind of footstop on an idea that few people outside the Trump administration really want the United States to withdraw from NATO or think that it actually will. Well, Ann, I'm curious from your perspective, how you're thinking about the way other world powers,

like China or Russia, are examining their role on the global stage in this moment? I mean, actually, I was going to say Russia is the elephant in the room that I don't think we were speaking quite enough about one of the behind-the-scenes things that people aren't talking about much in public, but Europeans do speak about a lot in private, is their fear that the United States is already partially aligned with Russia, that the American negotiations over Ukraine were the main goal of them

was not to bring peace and security or victory for Ukraine, but were designed to create the basis for a series of business deals between American companies and Russian companies. And this has been more or less said out loud at meetings of the so-called coalition of the willing, the group of countries who support Ukraine. And it's been said, you know, it's been published in, details have been published in the press as well. So this adds an extra layer to Europe's conversation about what should happen next. And I actually think the conversation a little bit farther along than Laura said, that there are conversations

about how Europe will defend itself. They're the beginning of planning. Europe is already the main source of funding and weapons for Ukraine, I think 90% or 95%, increasingly the source of intelligence for Ukraine, much more so than the United States. So you're seeing this shift in that sense already beginning. And of course, you know, the Russians are stepping back and watching this with some, I mean, I think they're a little confused by the Trump administration, but largely they're very pleased by this division inside NATO.

This is something they've been working towards for many years, both through use of propaganda, but also through threats and attempts to get various European leaders on their side, through the promotion of pro-Russian political parties across Europe, including Viktor Orban's party, but also others in Germany and France. And so this is for them a kind of ideal situation. They're simply hoping for this division. I mean, I think for the Chinese it's more complicated.

I think they're hoping for a better relationship with Europe as Europeans begin to seek trade arrangements with other parts of the world. There's now a European deal with India. There's one with an organization in South America. And many European leaders have gone recently to Beijing and are looking to expand that relation. I mean, there's a way in which almost everybody in the world now, really, is beginning to hedge. So hedging against the United States, figuring out what to do, you know, what all. alternative trade arrangements there are in the face of U.S. tariffs, what alternate security arrangements there are in the face of American unpredictability at the very least. And, you know,

Russian China may not have a clear path to advantage just yet, but they're certainly looking for it in this kind of chaos. Well, Ambassador Volker, I'm curious to hear from you. You know, we're in the fifth year of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. What does this moment mean for Ukraine, which is held out longer than anyone expected against Russia's aggression. There are concerns that Russia will try to expand its reach beyond Ukraine, and Ukraine, of course, is lobbied for a seat in NATO. So what does everything we're discussing today mean for the conflict in that country? There's a lot of things that are implied here, but one of the things that's happened lately is the war against Iran has taken attention away from Russia's war against Ukraine.

Ukraine. And it's prioritized air defense systems for the Gulf and for the United States forces rather than for Ukraine, for example. It has shown that Ukraine now has more advanced anti-dron technology at lower cost than the U.S. does. And so they're helping Gulf Arab states with that. It has given Vladimir Putin a windfall so that he's making more money on what oil and gas he can sell compared to where he was a while ago, that's going to give him more flexibility and likely prolong the war. But the long arc of this war has been Ukraine that was highly dependent on support from the West, and particularly the United States, in the first year or so of Russia's invasion, to a Ukraine that has become increasingly self-reliant with support from Europe.

They have developed their own drone and counter-dron technologies. They've developed their own long-range systems for attacking insulin. inside Russia, taking out strategic bases or fuel depots or things or even refineries in Russia. They are able to push back on the front lines now. They have better communications, better tactics. So Russia has basically gotten itself into a quagmire. They can't advance on the front line. They bomb cities at night, but there's no strategic effect.

So I think where we're headed here is there will ultimately be a C-Syceau. fire somewhere along the current front lines, never a peace agreement, because Vladimir Putin will never agree to peace with Ukraine, and everyone moves on. And sadly, I think the U.S. could and should have been leading this effort and supporting Ukraine because it's in our interest to push back against Vladimir Putin in Europe and prevent attacks elsewhere. But I think we will end up with a strong Ukraine, a secure Ukraine as part of European security, some point down the line. I'll leave the conversation there for now. That's former ambassador to NATO Kurt Volker. He's a distinguished fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis. Also with us today, Ann Applebaum, she's a writer for The Atlantic and Laura Jakes, foreign correspondent for the New York Times covering European security and military deterrence. Thanks to you all. Remember the 1A podcast is a great way to catch up on anything you might have missed. It's where you'll find our best guests and stories each day. Today's producer was Claire Muffson with help from Lauren

Hamilton and Haley Blassingame. This program comes to you from WAMU, part of American University in Washington, distributed by NPR. I'm Jen White-Tuddles-Willik is with you tomorrow for the Friday News Roundup. Hope you tune in. Thanks for listening, and we'll talk more soon.

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