What Would Relations with Post-War Russia Look Like?

You are listening to the War on the Rocks podcast on Strategy, Defense, and Foreign Affairs. My name is Ryan Evans. I'm the founder of Warren the Rocks. In this episode, I spoke to Rose Gautomuller, a seasoned American diplomat who was Deputy Secretary General of NATO a few years ago under Secretary General Jen Stoldenberg. Before that, she was the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, a very well-regarded scholar and longtime national security hand. She's also the author of security through cooperation, space nuclear weapons, and U.S. Russia relations after the Cold War, which I highly encourage you to pick up. Enjoy the show.

So Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, Marco Rubio, recently announced that the United States government was out of the business of trying to negotiate between Ukraine and Russia, which I think provides us a good moment to reflect on where we are in the war, but also where we are in our own relationship with Russia, which is I know something you think quite a lot about. Yes, it's interesting to me that Marco Rubio had that to say. I do think it's possible once President Trump gains some progress in his solution, whatever it is, over Iran, that he will want to get back to this negotiation. It was the other shiny object that he declared he wanted to achieve during his time running for office. But if he does not return to Ukraine and instead moves to another adventure, for example, in Cuba, then I do think that the Europeans will have to take over some role as they are looking to take over a role in the defense of Europe as well. In that case, the big and important step will be not to return to what we saw between 2014 and 2022. That is the Minsk process where the Europeans utterly failed to.

achieve successful negotiating momentum with the Russians and the Ukrainians. And it seems like the Minsk process would be just too toxic politically for Ukraine to return anything like that. I think it would be too toxic for everybody. You know, the Russians themselves also condemn it as being very ineffectual. Do you think that there was any constructive aspect to the Trump administration's effort to negotiate with and mediate between Ukraine and Russia? I think it was a sincere effort.

and for a while people like Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, with the president's authority behind them, seemed to be gathering some momentum. The big problem I saw with their interventions was that it wasn't a true negotiation and that they were not backed up with any expert help. They ended up coming out of meetings with confusing conclusions about what had been agreed. And negotiation 101 is to make sure you have a note taker in the room. And so it's clear what both sides have at least discussed, if not a agreed. agreed to at the end of the meeting. So all of those were, to my mind, rookie errors that could

have been avoided. Yeah, and I think absent real compelence leaning on Russia much harder than we are right now, it's hard for me to see how Vladimir Putin abandons his current position, which is just to keep fighting, because reportedly at least, he really thinks he can still take the Donbos. Exactly so. And the Trump administration never did anything to disabuse him of that notion. That was part of the confusion over what had been agreed that at some point, apparently the Trump negotiators thought they had achieved an agreement with regard to the Donbass. But it was clear that the Ukrainians said, no, we're not budging from our position. It's the line of control. And the Russians said, no, we're not budging from our position. We need the entire Donbass. So that was at the height of the confusion. And I think that it remains today where the two sides stand. You were Deputy Secretary of NATO during quite an interesting period from 2016 to 2019, which was during the first Trump administration. But you had been selected for that position by the Obama administration. So by the time Trump came in, you were already ensconced in that role.

Did that create some real tension? I have to say, I was selected for the position, but I was selected by the Secretary General of NATO, Yenstoldenberg. I was nominated for the position by President Obama, but it was a competition and there were other candidates. So I do want to stress that point. Yes, when President Trump came into office, there were some stresses and strains. There were media reports that he wanted to see me removed. But what came out afterwards, and luckily I had some friends at court in those. days and people looked into it, talked to the Trump transition team at the time, and they said,

we have no problem with Goddumuller in that role. Turned out there were some other mischief makers who were trying to insert some doubts. Anyone you'd care to name? No, not at this point, perhaps in my memoirs. And as Deputy Secretary, of course, your job, you were an American, but your job wasn't to coordinate with the American government. Your job was to help run this alliance organization. What did that involve? Yes. Well, as a typical deputy, part of my job was to run the building. And we were in a very old and decrepit. You might have been there, Ryan, the old NATO headquarters across the road from the new headquarters. When I first got there, there was a huge rainstorm one day, and I heard a trickling behind me. There was water running down the wall in my

office. So it was time to move to our new headquarters, and I was put in charge of that job when I first arrived. I never thought at that point in my career I'd be in charge of a big real estate move, but it was a remarkable experience. We made it happen. So, but it was that kind of division. of labor. Of course, Secretary General Stoltenberg was the outward face, and I was more of the inward face of the institution. And how was this is a time when the alliance was under enormous pressure, especially from the First Trump administration. My read on it anyway is the relationship between President Trump and NATO was actually much more hostile in the First Trump administration that it has been so far, at least, in the Second Trump administration, not that it's been

an easy road in this time, but there was talk of the U.S. leaving NATO very openly. I'm told that came quite close once or twice. You know, I see it somewhat opposite. It was a huge shock to the system at the time that the United States went from being the prima interparis, the first among equals, and embracing this leadership role come what may, to all of a sudden threatening not to fulfill Article 5 commitments under the Washington Treaty, the mutual defense and security guarantee, and also essentially threatening to walk away from the alliance, it had an enormous value in shock therapy at the time. And actually,

Jens Stoltenberg and I both agreed that this was a good way to get the allies finally to step up to their commitment to pay at the time 2% of their gross domestic product to defense. They were failing to meet that commitment. They'd made back in 2014 when Russia invaded Ukraine for the first time and grabbed Crimea. So Jens and I both felt it was a good therapy to apply, and he had a good working relationship with President Trump. So at the time, it seemed manageable, the relationship. Nowadays, to be honest, I feel quite the opposite, that there's a constant whipsawing going on

with the administration threatening to withdraw troops from Europe, then saying, oh, we're going to put more in Poland, we're taking some from Germany. And the allies are being constantly pulled one direction in the next, as I've understood talking to people in Europe. They don't understand exactly where the administration is heading, but they have made one firm conclusion that now defense in Europe is up to them. Yes, I think that a lot of this troop stuff we've seen recently has been the product of,

it seems that President Trump has given Secretary Pete Hegseth quite a lot of room to make certain, at least initial decisions. And it seems that those are decisions that came from the Pentagon and then were reversed by the White House, but it's hard to tell. It is. But if I may, we really do need to mention that the president got really angry at NATO allies for not helping him with his war in Iran and then not helping him to real. open the Straits of Hormuz. He is angry at the Allies now in a way I never saw during his first administration. So I think we see the pain being extracted now in return for that, and in particular within the last 24 hours talking about fewer major air assets like strategic bombers and fighters available in a crisis in Europe. Again, those decisions would be made in the Pentagon, but clearly

driven by the president's ire at the Allies. It is sort of risable that the administration, on one hand, starts this war of choice, and then goes and says, actually, can you help us clean up the consequences? And if you don't, you're not a true friend. So I can understand the negative reaction in Europe. Having said that, and this is not to defend the administration's position, the Hormuz situation is a giant mess. I don't think it's one the United States is going to be able to solve itself. Is there a role for Europe, or should there be a role for Europe, in solving this somehow beyond diplomatic support? Oh, absolutely. And NATO allies, individual allies, have already spoken about being willing to bring their naval forces to bear. And so I do think that we can

work this out. I think, to be honest with you, I think things are going to have to settle down a bit in terms of missiles and drones flying around in the region before NATO allies are going to be very keen to get in there. But nevertheless, I do think that they will step forward. And I do think there could be a role for others. Ideally, we could end up with something like we ended up with when we had the piracy crisis off the Horn of Africa a decade plus ago where a lot of countries came to this effort, including at the time countries like China and India. I don't see any reason why they shouldn't be involved, if not in the naval operation, then certainly in the attempts to convince Iran at the negotiating table that it's not in their

best interest to extract tolls for the use of Hormuz from here on out. You think a lot about our relationship with Russia, and now, Of course, in some ways there's a simplicity, and they are an adversary. They are on the other side of an aggressive invasion in which they're trying to dismantle the Ukrainian state unsuccessfully, it should be said. We also have to look towards a future in which that might not be the case after the war ends, and it will end eventually, maybe not. This year, maybe not even in five years.

But we do have to look towards what a more stable relationship with Russia looks like, both economically in terms of nuclear weapons. They remain a major nuclear power. You're thinking a lot about this. So tell us how you do think about this. Yeah, I just published this book, Security Through Cooperation with the Stanford University Press. And I dug down deep to remember what happened at the end of the Cold War when President Clinton formed this relationship with President Yeltsin. Clinton had this idea that we had to have an abiding security, economic, and political relationship with the Russian Federation, or there

would not be long-term peace and stability in Eurasia. So that led to a very intensive effort to cooperate with the Russian Federation, and I worked in that area on nuclear energy, counterterrorism, nuclear counterterrorism, and space cooperation with the Russian Federation, some of which ended up being very successful. The International Space Station is the shining example of that. So cooperation with Russia is possible, but it's not going to be possible again until we are done with this war of aggression in Ukraine, and there's a fair outcome for Ukraine. Russia's going to have to atone for the damage and death it's caused. But I do think in the future we should be looking to what might be possible with regard to cooperation with Russia.

And it will look quite different from the post-Cold War. It will be different, first and foremost, because the way technology has moved into the commercial sector, particularly take the space example. At the end of the Cold War, Russia and the United States were the leading edge of space technology providers. but nowadays those providers are in the commercial sector and Russia's behind the game. So I think we have to consider carefully where our interests lie. They're going to have to consider where their interests lie as well. But the areas where I think we might have some potential for cooperation reside in things like nuclear energy, where we need ourselves a lot of help getting off the ground with new modular reactors,

called them a vassal of China in some ways, yes, but they are also the younger brother of China in terms of science and technology. And I lay the blame for that very much at Vladimir Putin's door and the way he has emphasized the necessity of the defense economy. And there they are, considerable innovators. Look how fast they and the Ukrainians have moved the cycle between offense and defense on the drone front. So they can innovate, but in areas that are going to define the 21st century like artificial intelligence and quantum technology. technologies. They are lagging, and China and the United States are the ones who are leading the way. Do you agree that we're in an era where arms control between the major powers is, if not dead,

deep in hibernation? No. I've had a long life, Ryan, in this field, starting in the 1970s, I was at Georgetown University when the first Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement was signed in 1972. So I've watched many ups and downs. We fell into a deep freeze when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979. We were not extracted from that deep freeze on the negotiation front until Reagan got together with Gorbachevich at Reykivik in the mid-1980s. So I've seen long hiatuses occur, and I do feel that there will be an interest. If nothing else, there's an interest in mutual predictability. It doesn't make sense for us to be trying to sprint away from each other in a spiraling arms race without seeking some kind of predictability and mutual confidence in

where we're headed. I don't think anybody wants to return to where we were in the Cold War when the USSR built over 40,000 nuclear weapons and we built over 32,000 nuclear weapons. We just, we can't afford it. There are too many important conventional capabilities we need to acquire. And I know you yourself have written about this and spoken about this, but the China dimension here adds a lot of complexity. Doing major nuclear arms control between two powers, it's certainly not easy, but there's a two-way balance of power that can be assessed on each side and weighed, there are all these different costs and benefits when you throw in a third power that is rising China, whereas Russia is not, that creates a lot of complexity. Do you think there should be three-way arms control deals

or could be three-way arms control deals when it comes to nuclear weapons? I have a basic rule when it comes to arms negotiations, and that is it's the kiss rule, you know, keep it simple, stupid, try to keep things carved out in a way where you can, you can, achieve some goals, again, all in the service of mutual predictability. And it has to be seen in that light. It's not kind of a, sometimes people think about nuclear arms control as a sticky, gooey piece of diplomacy that's done to be nice to the other guy. But it's not. It's about mutual predictability and mutual deterrence as well. It's where you send your strong deterrence messages at the negotiating table. But I would say, look, China is modernizing. There's no way

around it. But I also would say we don't need to panic. They are at 600 warheads approximately today. We are at 4,000 warheads approximately today. We have time to work with this problem. And that's why I've been arguing for two parallel tracks. We keep working with our today peer in the nuclear arena, that is the Russian Federation, to try to keep some limits and controls going. And then we open up a line of communication with China to say, hey, look, you guys, you are heading in a direction that's causing us grave concern. How do we get the nuclear risks down. How do we get some controls and predictability into our nuclear relationship? Some people in the arms control community have been very concerned about what they view as

unwise or even decisions contrary to certain agreements when it comes to Australia, potentially getting nuclear submarines, now South Korea, potentially getting nuclear submarines, and the spread of nuclear technology in the military sphere. Is this a concern that you share? It is. And I take note that we had the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference just end. this past week without a successful outcome. And I do worry that this regime that's kept the lid on in terms of nuclear proliferation for so many years is the lid's starting to rise as the steam pressure builds. And so I really am concerned about what people call friendly proliferation that are allies concerned about the predictability of Washington at this moment will decide they need to head down

the road toward their own nuclear weapons. I don't think that will serve their security at all in the end of the day, and it's going to be a hugely expensive proposition. So I hope there are ways we can rebuild confidence in the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent. It's not going to be easy at this moment. Well, we'll argue with you a little bit about this. I take a, I mean, not entirely unusual view, but certainly an unconventional view that more nukes among our allies isn't such a bad thing, especially when you're looking at countries next to very large, very aggressive powers like China or Russia. Why is that a bad thing? I think when you have more nuclear weapons in the equation, then there are more opportunities for nuclear escalation, including accidental

or unauthorized nuclear escalation. And I'm concerned about that, particularly in settings where we have a lot more pressure on conventional proliferation at the moment. And I ask you to consider, Ryan, look, nuclear weapons did not buy a particular security in the case of even this massive nuclear weapon state, the Russian Federation. They have seen repeated and intensive attacks on their conventional energy infrastructure, and nuclear weapons hasn't helped them in that setting. So I say to people, think again about what kind of security nuclear weapons can buy you once the conventional war starts. Well, I do think nuclear weapons have helped Russia. Maybe they haven't deterred certain Ukrainian attacks, but they certainly have deterred some

forms of assistance from the United States to Ukraine, especially earlier in the war. So for that reason, the Ukrainians essentially thumb their nose at us, develop their own long-range conventional missiles and are attacking the Russian energy infrastructure. So if anything is causing cracks in the Vladimir Putin regime, I think it has to do with the effectiveness of the Ukrainian missile barrage at this time. I think Russia losing the war would certainly cause cracks in the regime. But I do think nuclear weapons certainly brought Russia some time and space that was important to reverse what in the early, especially the first year of the war was looking at like a collapse. Let me be clear that I do think that nuclear deterrence continues to

operate between the United States and the Russian Federation, United States, plus its allies and the Russian Federation. So it's not as if nuclear deterrence does not operate in any setting. I'm just arguing that for small states on the border of a large state like China, I assume you're referring to and thinking about the ROK, to my mind, it's not going to buy them security from conventional attack necessarily. Certainly it won't buy them security from hybrid attacks, which are, again, becoming much more common and prevalent at this time. Currently, you might be right. It depends on how we're liable of an ally we continue to be and how stable that alliance is currently, perhaps, as you know, I'm speaking to one of the masters here, but as you know, deterrence, you never really know if it's operating for sure. You can't have complete certainty, but it seems like one of the things deterring North Korea is our extended deterrence over South Korea. But South Korea isn't such a small country, and neither is Japan. Yeah, and honestly, both of them are quite prosperous comparatively when you look at DPRK and where it sits today, heavily military.

state without much advantage. It's not exactly a model. People say look to North Korea and how they've been able to defend themselves. Yes, heavily militarized state from the top of its nuclear deterrent to the bottom of its conventional forces and what else has it done for its people. Well, I think I'd much prefer being R. O.K. or Japan. If you were advising the administration on the current mess with Iran, you know, we don't really know for sure what's in this reported deal that's being negotiated. Unfortunately, we're in a position where both the U.S. and Iranian governments, of course, are not reliable public conveyors of truth when it comes to that right now. But we're in this sort of mess where we launched a war. Military campaign did not consider any number of things

seriously, in part because, in my opinion, it was not matched to a clear end state or a clear policy goal that a better peace that the war was trying to obtain. We are where we are, straight of Hormuz, which is a source of oil and oil-derived products for a huge part of the world, including some of the countries we were just talking about our Asian allies and partners. How would you advise the administration on how to handle this? I would advise a sharp focus on the Straits of Hormuz and ensuring that the Straits of Hormos are open and that the attempt by the Iranians to establish a toll booth there are for naught. We can't have that kind of precedent established for the narrow waterways. I've already heard, Straits of Malukkah, there's consideration of

establishing a toll booth in that region as well. It simply will not, I think, think, serve anybody's interests in terms of seaborne commerce going forward. And so I think figuring out, again, with a very wide coalition of countries involved, including also China and India, who have an interest in this matter, making sure that, first of all, the Straits of Hormuz are open and second, that we don't see a precedent established about those passages being monetized. That's really going to be, to my mind, the most important objective to achieve. I do believe that's the most important objective. I think what a lot of us are struggling right now are the appropriate costs to achieve that objective. Let's say the current round of diplomacy fails. Does that mean there should be a

resumption of war? Did the war in the first place even get Iran seriously to the negotiating table? I would argue that perhaps not, I mean they're negotiating, but perhaps not serious about it. Iran has a lot of advantages and they're willing to take a lot of pain as a sort of cultish, religiously fanatic regime. So what sort of force, if we should return to war, would be enough? to help correct the situation. Frankly, I'm very interested in the moment that they seem to be dangling and that is our negotiators seem to be dangling and the Iranians seem to be asking for access to their frozen assets.

And it seems to me that they are in that way showing some desperation about their economic situation and therefore there might be a way forward at the negotiating table at this moment with the promise of increasing the amounts of access to frozen assets if, again, we can get to yes with regard to the Straits of Formuz. It'll be interesting. They have an interest themselves in reopening free trade, obviously, in their oil products. So they should, in the end of the day, see their long-term interests in that direction, I would think. So a combination of frozen assets and reopening of oil trade could be an incentive for them to move in the right direction. There is this reports I'm sure you've seen of a Qatari deal where

they would extend some sort of very large loan to Iran in that way. The U.S. government could save face because it's not the U.S. government on freezing funds, and perhaps that's one route towards that. Yeah, that's an interesting idea. But we're both talking about the same thing, which is it's carrots at the moment that and dangling some monetary resources in front of Tehran that may help us to a solution here. But we'll have to see. Now that you finished a book, maybe you're focused.

I would think many people who finish books are sort of relieved to fall back into the pattern of reading books themselves before they write their next one. Is that what you're doing right now? Yes, in a way, I am. But I'm also reflecting a lot on a number of big, big issues that I think a lot of people are worried about, such as the implications of new technologies for our strategic nuclear deterrent forces. I've been very concerned and interested in how artificial intelligence and things like quantum computing will affect the reliability of our nuclear forces going forward. and trying to think, frankly, about the issues surrounding trying to marry up what is an 80-year-old technology, nuclear weapons, with fast-moving 21st century technologies. And I think there are lots of dangers there.

There are also, of course, some opportunities that we have to take advantage of. I'm sure a lot of young people come to you for advice. They come to me for advice, too, but you've had a much more impressive career than I've had. I just run an online magazine. I think what's striking about people of this young generation right now is their whole lives, the world has been in some sort of disorder in this post-9-11 world. Whereas, you know, I'm 42. I grew up remembering the post-cold war glow. The long peace.

Yes. Or a piece for us anyway. But yes. These young people have a completely different frame, I think. How does that inform the kind of advice you give them, the kind of guidance you give them when they say, hey, I think I want to get into national security? I really urged them to think about the excitement of where the 21st century ride is going to take them. I know a lot of my students at Stanford even are worried about artificial intelligence and how particular jobs may be snuffed out by artificial intelligence. They're trying to think strategically.

But I think I also say to them, this is a time of opportunity. I said, you're not going to end up sitting in some office for 40 years doing the same job. you're going to have opportunities to move from job to job. We already see that happening a lot out in California, but also that you will be constantly challenged to be creative and innovative, and this is going to be a life of interest as well as peril. So don't just consider it depressing that there's so much uncertainty out there, but see what you can do to grab for the good risks that come along.

I think a lot of very talented young people are looking at the world that we're in and all the political division and the pervasive course. political corruption. And for understandable reasons, they might throw their hands up and be like, well, I don't really want to be a part of this, this part of the world. What's your advice to someone with that concern? It's so interesting to me that, again, a lot of my students at Stanford remain in, and I think they beat a path to me because I have come out of this policy practitioner role in Washington. So they want to know about how to get into the Washington game. But there are still a lot of really good young people who are committed to working in the policy space in

Washington. And I'm encouraged by that because they see the corruption, they see the whip-sawing of current U.S. policy, how our allies are being treated, and how uncertain everything is, but they want to fix it. And they really have in mind trying to find ways to marry up what's happening on the innovation and science front with U.S. policy going forward. So if my students have anything to do with it, it's going to be a more positive future, I would say. Thank you. Thanks so much for listening to this episode of the War on the Rocks podcast. Don't forget to check out our membership program at war on the rocks.com

slash membership, as well as Rose's new book, security through cooperation, available through the Stanford University Press. Stay safe and stay healthy.