How the Iran war and peace talks are straining the U.S.-Israel alliance
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387 segmentsThe consequences of peace. With U.S. and Iran talks underway and Israel's sideline in the process, we now know the answers to questions we asked three months ago. Can a war launch together be ended together? And is there a limit to U.S.-Israeli partnership? Tonight, the reasons behind President Trump's public tensions with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu Netanyak. And what the U.S. and Iran agreement says, but America's alliance with Israel, coming up. I'm coming up.
Hello and welcome to Compass Points. Just four months ago, the U.S. and Israel launched a joint war with a level of military and political integration rarely seen in history. But the U.S. is now unilaterally negotiating a memorandum of understanding with Iran that Israeli officials have openly criticized. The president and vice president have in turn publicly criticized Israel. And the fighting in Lebanon between Israel and Hezbollah remains a major challenge that could undermine the deal. So, how fine is the line that Benjamin Netanyahu walks, as he's viewed by critics as an impediment to peace?
And what does that tension say about the future of the U.S. Israel Alliance? To discuss that, I'm joined in Tel Aviv by Michael Herzog. He was until last year, Israel's ambassador to the United States, and is now a distinguished fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. And here with me in the studio, Daniel Pletka, distinguished senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and Aaron David Miller, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and former Senior State Department Advisor in Republican and Democratic administrations on Arab-Israeli negotiations.
Thanks very much. Welcome back to Compass Points. Ambassador Herzog, I want to start with you. Did the U.S. treat Israel as an ally in this war, but is now not treating Israel as a partner in the peace? Well, what we see is that while as we are fighting Iran together, we're very close and closely aligned. And this type of war, of course, necessitates a high level of trust, coordination, and cooperation.
But when it comes to a diplomatic settlement or diplomatic outcome, we part ways, and we don't fear that the U.S. considers Israel a partner to that, probably because they decided to opt out of the war, and they feel that the Israeli government would like to press on. I must say that here in Israel, there's widespread disappointment from the U.S.-Iran MOU, having fought together the Israeli expectation. I'm talking about general consensus here from right to left. It's not only opposition in the coalition.
There's no such division on Iran. There was an expectation that the amazing military achievement we scored together would be translated into a strong, enduring diplomatic outcome, focused on the nuclear issue. And instead, we got a general MOU, which kicks the can down the road in terms of a solid nuclear arrangement. And on top of that, it links the Lebanese and the Iranian theater something
that both Israel and Lebanon are opposed. And is it, do you think, the nature of the memorandum of understanding, and I'll list some of those specifics in a second, or also the fact that Benjamin Netanyahu seems to have much less say in the conclusion of the war than he had in the beginning or the outcome, the conduct.
to the war itself. That is true. I don't think it was party to shaping the MOU. I mean, he had many conversations with President Trump, expressed his opinion, but ultimately the U.S. went its own way. And what I understand is that Israel was not really consulted on that. It was quite surprised and disappointed by the outcome. Danny, is that right? Was the Israel not really consulted about the outcome and was surprised by it?
Oh, yeah. I found absolutely nothing to disagree with in anything Ambassador Herzog said. The decision, this was a decision that was made very much in Trump world. And when I say Trump world, I mean in the very, very tiny, tiny circle that is the president and his main advisors. to the extent that countries like Qatar, the OA, E, and others were involved, they were more involved as kibitzers, if I can use that diplomatic term. They were the peanut gallery that was influencing the people who are talking to the president. They were not being asked, is this, is this okay? Do you have concerns? Is there a different outcome? Should we be doing this?
What have we missed? What are you most worried about? None of those conversations were happening. Aaron, should we be surprised that the President of the United States decided to end the war the way he wanted to end the war? No, because in a war of choice without clearly articulated objectives and no sense of correlating the means at our disposal to achieve those objectives, underestimating an adversary, a brutal authoritarian repressive regime that has weaponized geography, now made the straits their new nuclear weapon.
I think it was inevitable. I think Danny's right, and it's great to be here with Mike and you, Nick, that divergence, not just in tactics and strategy, was implicit almost from the beginning of the war. And it does not surprise in the least that this president, transactional, cares about Israel, but cares more about Donald Trump and how it all is going to look and be perceived. That's why I think we are where we are. And let's put an underline on this difference between the beginning of the war and where we are today. Take a listen to how Benjamin Netanyahu described the U.S.-Israeli relationship in mid-March, just a few weeks into the war,
and then how President Trump described Benjamin Netanyahu just last week. We are now a mighty power, almost global, together with our ally, who is the global superpower, fighting shoulder to shoulder. We're the big partner, and he's the very small partner. Ambassador Herzog, how do you reconcile those two statements? What happened between March and now? Well, as I said, the two parties parted away when it came, when the U.S. decided to end the war on these terms. And the feeling was that it wouldn't satisfy Israel and that Israel wanted to push on.
So here we are witnessing some. tensions, I think the tensions today are focused on Lebanon. The very fact that the Trump administration decided to link the Iranian and Lebanese theater is a very big challenge to Israel. Because since the Trump administration announced a ceasefire in Lebanon, we lost many soldiers, not only in Lebanon, but also in Israel itself, from drones, from rockets, other military instruments. And the feeling is that there's only fire, no ceasefire.
And that we should have prioritized that the direction in Lebanon should be decided in negotiations between the Israeli and Lebanese governments, not in negotiations between the U.S. and Iranian governments. Iran has no role to play in Lebanon as far as we are concerned as far as the Lebanese are concerned. This injected a lot of tension. And so one thing that Israel did was hold its fire, save for incidents where you have to, you need self-defense. But other than that, we're not proactive. And now the Iranians are trying to frame the debate around Israeli deployment in southern Lebanon, namely they're saying we will not sign the
the ultimate deal unless Israel withdraws from southern Lebanon. If the US adopt this position, it puts Mr. Benjamin Netanyahu in an impossible position. He has to decide between his own political base and we are headed to elections and between his relations with President Trump. I think that's a key question. And also, it's not only Lebanon, although that's obviously one of the flashpoints. the Iranian regime has already received permission to sell oil in dollars, gets $300 billion in the long run at least for a reconstruction fund.
We'll see if that actually happens. The deal does not address Iranian missiles or proxies. And when it comes to Ambassador Herzog's point about Lebanon, listen to how President Trump describes Israel's actions in Lebanon. Too many people are being killed. And you don't have to knock down an apartment house every time you're looking for somebody. because there are a lot of people in those apartment houses, and they're not all Esbalah.
Aaron, how does Benjamin Netanyahu address these issues, address Lebanon without alienating Donald Trump? I mean, I think he's navigating a very fine line between a domestic constituency. Forget his own government for a minute. Just imagine a million residents of Northern Israel in the border communities. They feel betrayed that he exposed them by beginning this war.
They feel betrayed by the fact that the IDF is now constrained. I think you have 36 Israelis killed. Israeli soldiers since March. Iranians are using, as well as using fiber optic drones, the Israelis don't have an answer. But they also have no military solution. This is, in essence, it seems to me, the problem. So on one hand, he's navigating the domestic constraints
and then trying to keep the president happy. I think they've found a way to manage this, maybe, by not... The two men managing it. By not pushing for Israeli withdrawal. And if the Iranians aren't careful, they'll overplay their hand because they are using Lebanon, I think, to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Israel and to create a zone of immunity for Isbalah.
And, Danny, I saw you shaking your head about missiles especially, right? President Trump started the war saying that he was going to decimate Iranian missiles. Now, apparently, let's listen again, he believes they're going to be okay. I have guys, I like some of these guys. But I don't think they're smart. Sir, you shouldn't let them have any missile. I said, well, what am I going to do? Are they going to let Saudi Arabia have missiles, but they can't have them?
Yes, sir. Kent doesn't work that way, you know? It doesn't work that way. And missiles aren't the problem. Missiles, they hurt a little location, but they don't blow up the planet. Danny, missiles aren't the problem. Iran fired more than 600 missiles at Israel during this war. Look, let me contextualize this.
I think we know this, but let's contextualize this for your viewers. Donald Trump is a businessman from New York and a very successful entrepreneur and a very market-sensitive politician. He has a real feral sense for sort of the public pulse. And I give him a lot of credit for that. security policy, it's not just that he has no vision. There's nothing there. There's nothing there.
And we all understand what happens when there's nothing there. Nature abhors a vacuum. National security experts abhor a vacuum. He is getting advised by different people who have different agendas. And when this conflict started, he was listening to one group of people. throughout the course of the conflict, that changed, and then as the conflict did not turn out exactly as he had wanted, and I always find the best analogy for me, excuse me, to 14-year-old boys,
is that I think of him like that, right? I went over to my friend's house and we were supposed to do X, and they didn't do it, and mom, I am never talking to him again, right? That's how you need to think of the president. Then he adjusted to the people who he wanted to hear from, And now he's listening to other people. And so if you look at the trajectory, what you see is at the beginning
he was listening to his friends in Israel, friends who are supporters of a strong American posture towards Iran, people like not me, but people like me. And as this changed, he is now listening to Steve Witkoff, Tom Barrack, and Jared Kushner. And I can explain why people always say, oh, Jared Kushner, he's Jewish,
He must support Israel. But in any case, he is now listening and he is using Iran's talking points. These are Iran's talking points, and we should be very, very overt about it. And by the way, not letting you get a word in edgewise neck, by the way, the MOU looks like it was written by, and I believe certainly was drafted by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Can I just point? I mean, I think this last point that I made is absolutely correct.
I mean, I've been around negotiations for a while. We had very bad lawyers and very bad negotiators. The fact that Article 1, the first, like Article 1 of our Constitution, talks about Congress as the most important branch. Article 1 mentions Lebanon three times. It's the very first sentence. Who negotiated this on our side? The President's son-in-law and his best friend. You can't operate.
you can't run the railroad of national security like that. So, but let's get to brass tax here. Let's get to a question of where does this actually lead policy-wise? Where is this lead to the U.S. and Israel? And of course, part of the relationship between the two men is, shall we say, rhetorical flourishes that come out of the President of the United States. Benjamin Netanyahu's aides tell me he's gotten used to these, but nonetheless, let me just highlight one. So in their new book, New York Times reporters, Maggie Haberman, Jonathan Swan, say, on one
call, President of the United States, Donald Trump, told Benjamin Netanyahu, all the Jews are sick of you. Even the two Jews on this call are sick of you. That was a reference to Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. And I just want to be clear here, I am quoting a book. The president has told Fox is Trey Yinks, Oxios, Barack Ravid. Benjamin Netanyahu has, quote, no effing judgment. What the F are you doing? You're effing crazy.
Now, we know Trump is not the first cursor in chief. let's be honest, right? But, Aaron, has any American president ever talked to or about an Israeli prime minister? No. And so what... I mean, a thousand times no. I mean, Jimmy Carter, I worked with Jimmy Carter to Bush 43. You could throw an Obama and Biden.
The answer is no. No American president or vice president, for that matter, has ever talked about an Israeli prime minister the way they have. And no American president has ever willfully leaked the contents of his private phone conversation. That wasn't him leaking that. I hate to that. No, but the president has confirmed some of this himself.
And for Trump, I think it works. But we're a far cry from that to what, to me, is more important. And that is, will the administration impose any costs or consequences? That's a critically important question. On Iran? Or on Iran. When it comes to weapons.
On Israel. Right. Will the U.S. actually impose consequences policy- My answer is no. They're not going to restrict their inclusion in military assistance. They're not going to stop intelligence sharing. They're not going to stop research and development. They're not going to stop discussions over an MOU for the next 10 years.
They're not going to adopt their own security counts of resolutions critical Israel or vote for someone else's. They're not going to do any of that, in my judgment. Yeah. Danny, you're not convinced. I think that we can persuade ourselves that that, that, that, that, you can persuade ourselves that, that a lot of this is, you know, storm and drawing, it's just signifying nothing. Sound and fury.
Sorry to Shakespeare. Signifying nothing. But I think that masks the fact that we are at an inflection point in American relations with Israel. And just to bring it back to Lebanon for a second and then we can talk about American politics if you want to, Nick.
But on the question of Lebanon, As I watch these negotiations and I watch poor President Alon of Lebanon, who's one of the first in recent years to actually have the guts to want to do something about Hezbollah. And take on Hezbollah rhetorically, publicly. Right. So what I see in the Middle East is that it is a block of the president of Lebanon, the Emirates, a couple of other Arab states and Israel, who are arranged and don't trust the United States now.
it wasn't just Benjamin Netanyahu that Donald Trump was undercutting when he talked about Lebanon. He was also undercutting the president of Lebanon who had said Hezbollah has no place in his country. Ambassador Hurtzok, bring us back to Benjamin Netanyahu and the President of the United States. We played all the rhetoric. You heard Aaron's point, right? Well, it won't translate the policy. But for Benjamin Netanyahu, he's facing an election, as you pointed out. His aides tell me for the first time they really do believe they're not sure they're going to win.
How politically perilous is this for BB to have the President of the United States saying what he's saying and doing what he's doing? Look, it's evident that there are a lot of tensions between President Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. And it's also clear that President Trump speaks in a way that no other president has spoken. I've been on calls between presidents in the U.S. and prime ministers in Israel. Well, it's Trump, you know, is very different and unique in this sense. But I think that the first, the U.S.-Israel relations are bigger than those two personalities. And, I mean, we just fought shoulder to shoulder together in a way no other two nations could have done. And we still may have many other things going for us together.
But what I want to say policy-wise is that the U.S. This Iran, MOU is at odds not only with Israel, but also with other regional actors. As Daniel noted correctly, there's an agreement between Israel and Lebanon that the focus should be on disarming Hezbollah. We just started negotiations between our two governments recently, and in those negotiations, we announced together with the United States that the starting point should be the redeployment of Hezbollah south of the Littani River. and the disarmament of Hezbollah.
The MOU contradicts that. And I think the way for Israel to navigate today for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is to accelerate negotiations with Lebanon and create a roadmap, which will include Israeli redeployment in southern Lebanon as against the deployment of Lebanese armed forces in certain areas. That's a way to go about it and not act under an Iranian dictate. You also asked about missiles. So when come to missiles, of course, this is a major Israeli concern because it's one of the reason we initiated the war because their missile arsenal was reaching very, very dangerous level, a strategic threat to Israel.
But during that war, Iran fired at the UAE and other Gulf countries, no less the rockets and missiles than it fired Israel. And now they are concerned. And they issued a statement saying any future deal with Iran should include limitations on their ballistic missile. So the problem is not only with Israel. It's a regional problem. It's a regional concern for sure. Danny, you asked if I wanted to do U.S. domestic politics, I do for the last few minutes. I want to turn to Vice President JD Vance.
He's leading the negotiations with Iran, of course. And let's listen to his warning, his warning to what he called Israeli critics of the memorandum. of understanding. If I was in the cabinet of the Israeli government, I might not be attacking the only powerful ally that I have anywhere left in the entire world. Vice President JD Vance added, Israel had to, quote, smell the reality of the situation the country is in. Does his warning resonate?
And what does it say that JD Vance is saying this ahead of what is presumably a presidential run? Right. So my theory of the game is that. that, and certainly I don't see anything to refute that, is that Vice President JD Vance didn't agree with the war. A lot of the leaking that we saw, both to Maggie Haberman and John Swan, but also to others, has come from JD Vance. And I know that.
And he wants everybody to know that he opposed it. He also wants everybody to understand one leak from the Situation Room that Benjamin Netanyahu was the one. who was encouraging the United States to join them in this war. He is positioning himself to say, well, of course I supported my president, because I supported my president. But we needed to get out. We wanted to get out.
And the Israelis, the Jews, wouldn't let us do it. And that's where I had to come on strong. Because everything that went wrong here is the fault of Israel pushing us too hard. That's how he squares the circle for himself, moving forward. into 2028 and gets back into the good graces of the fringes of the Republican Party that Donald Trump has repudiated. And so, Aaron, if that is the case, what is next for Israel, right? Because, and I just want to add this, right, we saw this week Democratic candidates in New York, who are overtly critical of Israel win the Democratic primary. So what is the future look like?
What's next for Israel in U.S. relations if Israel is becoming partisan? And Benjamin Netanyahu at least is being sidelining these. Yeah, look, there are three foundational elements of this relationship. Value affinity, right, we share common values. And clearly, we're both backsliding on this. A high coincidence of interest. No strict down the line, but a high... And then finally, a strong bipartisan basis of domestic support.
I have never seen in my time these foundations underwerect. more stress than they are now. Israel isn't a dangerous neighborhood, but it has demonstrated a degree of escalation, dominance, and military power that is extraordinary. Nonetheless, Israel has become Goliath. It's no longer viewed as David and large parts of the Democratic Party
and increasing numbers of Republicans. But we only have one president at a time. So what I'll be looking for between now and October, it's whether or not Donald Trump, sets up re-elect Benjamin Netanyahu campaign headquarters in Washington. That, to me, is the test, at least, for now. For now, absolutely. Aaron, David Miller, Danny Pleka, Ambassador Mike Herzog, thank you very much.
Really appreciate all of you being here, and that is all the time we have for now. Thank you at home for joining us. I'm Nick Schiffran. We'll see you here again next week on Compass Points.